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Executive summary 
 
 
In September 2015, the member states of the United Nations endorsed sustainable development 
goals (SDG) for 2030 that aspire to human rights-centered approaches to ensuring the health and 
well-being of all people. The SDGs embody both the UN Charter values of rights and justice for 
all and the responsibility of states to rely on the best scientific evidence as they seek to better 
humankind. In April 2016, these same states will consider control of illicit drugs, an area of 
social policy that has been fraught with controversy, seen as inconsistent with human rights 
norms, and for which scientific evidence and public health approaches have arguably played too 
limited a role.   
 
The previous UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on drugs in 1998 – convened 
under the theme “a drug-free world, we can do it!” – endorsed drug control policies based on the 
goal of prohibiting all use, possession, production, and trafficking of illicit drugs. This goal is 
enshrined in national law in many countries. In pronouncing drugs a “grave threat to the health 
and well-being of all mankind,” the 1998 UNGASS echoed the foundational 1961 convention of 
the international drug control regime, which justified eliminating the “evil” of drugs in the name 
of “the health and welfare of mankind.” But neither of these international agreements refers to 
the ways in which pursuing drug prohibition itself might affect public health. The “war on drugs” 
and “zero-tolerance” policies that grew out of the prohibitionist consensus are now being 
challenged on multiple fronts, including their health, human rights, and development impact. 
 
The Johns Hopkins – Lancet Commission on Drug Policy and Health has sought to examine the 
emerging scientific evidence on public health issues arising from drug control policy and to 
inform and encourage a central focus on public health evidence and outcomes in drug policy 
debates, such as the important deliberations of the 2016 UNGASS on drugs.  
 
The Johns Hopkins-Lancet Commission is concerned that drug policies are often colored by 
ideas about drug use and drug dependence that are not scientifically grounded. The 1998 
UNGASS declaration, for example, like the UN drug conventions and many national drug laws, 
does not distinguish between drug use and drug abuse. A 2015 report by the UN High 
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Commissioner for Human Rights, by contrast, found it important to emphasize that “[d]rug use is 
neither a medical condition nor does it necessarily lead to drug dependence.” The idea that all 
drug use is dangerous and evil has led to enforcement-heavy policies and has made it difficult to 
see potentially dangerous drugs in the same light as potentially dangerous foods, tobacco, 
alcohol for which the goal of social policy is to reduce potential harms.  
 
Health impact of drug policy based on enforcement of prohibition 
The pursuit of drug prohibition has generated a parallel economy run by criminal networks. Both 
these networks, which resort to violence to protect their markets, and the police and sometimes 
military or paramilitary forces that pursue them contribute to violence and insecurity in 
communities affected by drug transit and sales. In Mexico, the dramatic increase in homicides 
since the government decided to use military forces against drug traffickers in 2006 has been so 
great that it reduced life expectancy in the country. 
 
Injection of drugs with contaminated equipment is a well-known route of HIV exposure and viral 
hepatitis transmission. People who inject drugs (PWID) are also at high risk of tuberculosis. The 
continued spread of unsafe injection-linked HIV contrasts the progress that has been seen in 
reducing sexual and vertical transmission of HIV in the last three decades. The Commission 
found that that repressive drug policing greatly contributes to the risk of HIV linked to injection. 
Policing may be a direct barrier to services such as needle and syringe programmes (NSP) and 
use of non-injected opioids to treat dependence among those who inject opioids, known as opioid 
substitution therapy (OST). Police seeking to boost arrest totals have been found to target 
facilities that provide these services to find, harass, and detain large numbers of people who use 
drugs. Drug paraphernalia laws that prohibit possession of injecting equipment lead PWID to 
fear carrying syringes and force them to share equipment or dispose of it unsafely. Policing 
practices undertaken in the name of the public good have demonstrably worsened public health 
outcomes. 
 
Amongst the most significant impacts of pursuit of drug prohibition identified by the 
Commission with respect to infectious disease is the excessive use of incarceration as a drug-
control measure. Many national laws impose lengthy custodial sentences for minor, non-violent 
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drug offenses; people who use drugs (PWUD) are over-represented in prison and pretrial 
detention. Drug use and drug injection occur in prisons, though their occurrence is often denied 
by officials. HIV and hepatitis C virus (HCV) transmission occurs among prisoners and 
detainees, often complicated by co-infection with TB and in many places multidrug-resistant TB, 
and too few states offer prevention or treatment services in spite of international guidelines that 
urge comprehensive measures, including provision of injection equipment, for people in state 
custody. 
 
Mathematical modelling undertaken by the Commission illustrates that incarceration and high 
HCV risk in the post-incarceration period can contribute importantly to national HCV incidence 
amongst PWID in a range of countries with varying levels of incarceration, different average 
prison sentences, durations of injection, and OST coverage levels in prison and following 
release. For example, in Thailand where PWID may spend nearly half their injection careers in 
prison, an estimated 63% of incident HCV infection could occur in prison. In Scotland, where 
prison sentences are shorter for PWUD and OST coverage is relatively high in prison, an 
estimated 54% of incident HCV infection occurs in prison, but as much as 21% may occur in the 
high-risk post-release period. These results underscore the importance of alternatives to prison 
for minor drug offences, ensuring access to OST in prison, and a seamless link from prison 
services to OST in the community. 
 
The evidence also clearly demonstrates that drug law enforcement has been applied in a 
discriminatory way against racial and ethnic minorities in a number of countries. The US is 
perhaps the best documented but not the only case of racial biases in policing, arrest, and 
sentencing.  In 2014, African American men were more than five times more likely than whites 
to be incarcerated in their lifetime, though there is no significant difference in rates of drug use 
among these populations. The impact of this bias on communities of people of color is inter-
generational and socially and economically devastating. 
 
The Commission also found significant gender biases in current drug policies. Of women in 
prison and pretrial detention around the world, a higher percentage are detained because of drug 
infractions than is the case for men. Women involved in drug markets are often on the bottom 
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rungs – as couriers or drivers – and may not have information about major traffickers to trade as 
leverage with prosecutors. Gender and racial biases have marked overlap, making this an 
intersectional threat to women of color, their children, families, and communities. 
 
In both prison and the community, HIV, HCV and TB programmes for PWUD – including 
testing, prevention and treatment – are gravely underfunded at the cost of preventable death and 
disease. In a number of middle-income countries where large numbers of PWUD live, HIV and 
TB programmes for PWUD that were expanded with support from the Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, TB and Malaria have lost funding due to changes in the Fund’s eligibility criteria. There 
is an unfortunate failure to emulate the example of Western European countries that have 
eliminated unsafe injection-linked HIV as a public health problem by sustainably scaling up 
prevention and care and enabling minor offenders to avert prison.  Political resistance to harm 
reduction measures dismisses strong evidence of their effectiveness and cost-effectiveness. 
Mathematical modeling shows that if OST, NSP and antiretroviral therapy for HIV are all 
available, even if the coverage of each of them is not over 50%, their synergy can lead to 
effective prevention in a foreseeable future.  PWUD are often not seen to be worthy of costly 
treatments, or they are thought not to be able to adhere to treatment regimens in spite of evidence 
to the contrary.  
 
Lethal drug overdose is an important public health problem, particularly in light of rising 
consumption of heroin and prescription opioids in some parts of the world. Yet the Commission 
found that the pursuit of drug prohibition can contribute to overdose risks in numerous ways. It 
creates unregulated illegal markets in which it is impossible to control adulterants of street drugs 
that add to overdose risk. Several studies also link aggressive policing to rushed injection and 
overdose risk. People with a history of drug use, over-represented in prison because of 
prohibitionist policies, are at extremely high risk of overdose when released from state custody. 
Lack of ready access to OST also contributes to injection of opioids, and bans on supervised 
injection sites cut off an intervention that has proven very effective in reducing overdose deaths. 
Restrictive drug policies also contribute to unnecessary controls on naloxone, a medicine that can 
reverse overdose very effectively.  
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Though a small percentage of PWUD will ever need treatment for drug dependence, that 
minority faces enormous barriers to humane and affordable treatment in many countries. There 
are often no national standards for quality of drug dependence treatment and no regular 
monitoring of practices. In too many countries, beatings, forced labor, and denial of health care 
and adequate sanitation are offered in the name of treatment, including in compulsory detention 
centres that are more like prisons than treatment facilities. Where there are humane treatment 
options, it is often the case that those most in need of it cannot afford it. In many countries, there 
is no treatment designed particularly for women, though it is known that women’s motivations 
for and physiological reactions to drug use differ from those of men.  
 
The pursuit of the elimination of drugs has led to aggressive and harmful practices targeting 
people who grow crops used in the manufacture of drugs, especially coca leaf, opium poppy, and 
cannabis. Aerial spraying of coca fields in the Andes with the defoliant glyphosate (N-
(phosphonomethyl glycine) has been associated with respiratory and dermatological disorders 
and with miscarriages. Forced displacement of poor rural families who have no secure land 
tenure exacerbates their poverty and food insecurity and in some cases forces them to move their 
cultivation to more marginal land. Geographic isolation makes it difficult for state authorities to 
reach drug crop cultivators in public health and education campaigns and it cuts cultivators off 
from basic health services. Alternative development programmes meant to offer other livelihood 
opportunities have poor records and have rarely been conceived, implemented, or evaluated with 
respect to their impact on people’s health. 
 
Research on drugs and drug policy has suffered from the lack of a diversified funding base and 
assumptions about drug use and drug pathologies on the part of the dominant funder, the US 
government. At a time when drug policy discussions are opening up around the world, there is an 
urgent to bring the best of non-ideologically-driven health science, social science and policy 
analysis to the study of drugs and the potential for policy reform. 
 
Policy alternatives in real life  
Concrete experiences from many countries that have modified or rejected prohibitionist 
approaches in their response to drugs can inform discussions of drug policy reform. A number of 
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countries, such as Portugal and the Czech Republic, decriminalised minor drug offenses years 
ago, with significant savings of money, less incarceration, significant public health benefits, and 
no significant increase in drug use. Decriminalisation of minor offenses along with scaling up 
low-threshold HIV prevention services enabled Portugal to control an explosive unsafe injection-
linked HIV epidemic and likely enabled the Czech Republic to prevent one from happening.  
 
Where formal decriminalisation may not be an immediate possibility, scaling up health services 
for PWUD can demonstrate the value to society of responding with support rather than 
punishment to people who commit minor drug infractions. A pioneering OST program in 
Tanzania is encouraging communities and officials to consider non-criminal responses to heroin 
injection. In Switzerland and the city of Vancouver, Canada, dramatic improvements in access to 
comprehensive harm reduction services, including supervised injection sites and heroin-assisted 
treatment, transformed the health picture for PWUD. Vancouver’s experience also illustrates the 
importance of meaningful participation of PWUD in decision-making on policies and 
programmes affecting their communities.   
 
Conclusions and recommendations 
Policies meant to prohibit or greatly suppress drugs present a paradox.  They are portrayed and 
defended vigorously by many policy-makers as necessary to preserve public health and safety, 
and yet the evidence suggests they have contributed directly and indirectly to lethal violence, 
communicable disease transmission, discrimination, forced displacement, unnecessary physical 
pain, and the undermining of people’s right to health.   
 
Some would argue that the threat of drugs to society may justify some level of abrogation of 
human rights for protection of collective security, as is also foreseen by human rights law in case 
of emergencies. International human rights standards dictate that in such cases, societies still 
must choose the least harmful way to address the emergency and that emergency measures must 
be proportionate and designed specifically to meet transparently defined and realistic goals. The 
pursuit of drug prohibition meets none of these criteria.  
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Standard public health and scientific approaches that should be part of policy-making on drugs 
have been rejected in the pursuit of prohibition. The idea of reducing the harm of many kinds of 
human behavior is central to public policy in the areas of traffic safety, tobacco and alcohol 
regulation, food safety, safety in sports and recreation, and many other areas of human life where 
the behavior in question is not prohibited. But explicitly seeking to reduce drug-related harms 
through policy and programmes and to balance prohibition with harm reduction is regularly 
resisted in drug control. The persistence of unsafe injection-linked HIV and HCV transmission 
that could be stopped with proven, cost-effective measures remains one of the great failures of 
the global responses to these diseases.  
 
Drug policy that is dismissive of extensive evidence of its own negative impact and of 
approaches that could improve health outcomes is bad for all concerned.  Countries have failed 
to recognise and correct the health and human rights harms that pursuit of prohibition and drug 
suppression have caused and in so doing neglect their legal responsibilities. They readily 
incarcerate people for minor offenses but then neglect their duty to provide health services in 
custodial settings. They recognize uncontrolled illegal markets as the consequence of their 
policies, but they do little to protect people from toxic, adulterated drugs that are inevitable in 
illegal markets or the violence of organized criminals, often made worse by policing. They waste 
public resources on policies that do not demonstrably impede the functioning of drug markets, 
and they miss opportunities to invest public resources wisely in proven health services for people 
often too frightened to seek services. 
 
To move toward the balanced policy that UN member states have called for, we offer the 
following recommendations: 
 Decriminalisation: Decriminalise minor, non-violent drug offenses – use, possession, and 
petty sale – and strengthen health and social-sector alternatives to criminal sanctions.   
 Reducing violence and discrimination in policing: Reduce the violence and other harms of 
drug policing, including phasing out the use of military forces in drug policing, better 
targeting of policing on the most violent armed criminals, allowing possession of syringes, 
not targeting harm reduction services to boost arrest totals, and eliminating racial and ethnic 
discrimination in policing. 
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 Reducing harms: Ensure easy access for all who need them to harm reduction services as a 
part of responding to drugs, recognizing the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of scaling 
up and sustaining these services. OST, NSP, supervised injection sites, and access to 
naloxone – brought to a scale adequate to meet demand – should all figure in health services 
and should include meaningful participation of PWUD in planning and implementation. 
Harm reduction services are crucial in prison and pretrial detention and should be scaled up 
in these settings. The 2016 UNGASS should do better than the UN Commission on Narcotic 
Drugs (CND) in naming harm reduction explicitly and endorsing its centrality to drug policy. 
 Treatment and care for PWUD: Prioritize PWUD in treatment for HIV, HCV, TB, and 
ensure that services are adequate to ensure access for all who need care. Ensure availability 
of humane and scientifically sound treatment for drug dependence, including scaled-up OST 
in the community as well as in prisons, rejecting compulsory detention and abuse in the name 
of treatment.    
 Access to controlled medicines: Ensure access to controlled medicines, establishing inter-
sectoral national authorities to determine levels of need and giving the World Health 
Organization (WHO) the resources to assist the International Narcotics Control Board 
(INCB) in using the best science to determine the level of need for controlled medicines in all 
countries.  
 Gender-responsive policies: Reduce the negative impact of drug policy and law on women 
and their families, especially minimizing custodial sentences for women who commit non-
violent offenses and developing appropriate health and social support, including gender-
appropriate treatment of drug dependence, for those who need it. 
 Crop production: Efforts to address drug crop production must take health into account. 
Aerial spraying of toxic herbicides should be stopped, and alternative development 
programmes should be part of integrated development strategies, developed and implemented 
in meaningful consultation with the people affected.  
 Improve research: There is a need for a more diverse donor base to fund the best new 
science on drug policy experiences in a non-ideological way that, among other things, 
interrogates and moves beyond the excessive pathologising of drug use. 
 UN governance of drug control: UN governance of drug policy must be improved, 
including by respecting WHO’s authority to determine the dangerousness of drugs. Countries 
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should be urged to include high-level health officials in their delegations to CND.  Improved 
representation of health officials in national delegations to CND would, in turn, be a likely 
result of giving health authorities an important day-to-day role in multi-sectoral national drug 
policy-making bodies.  
 Better metrics: Health, development, and human rights indicators should be included in 
metrics to judge success of drug policy; WHO and UNDP should help formulate them. 
UNDP has already suggested that indicators such as access to treatment, rate of overdose 
deaths, and access to social welfare programmes for people who use drugs would be useful 
indicators. All drug policies should also be monitored and evaluated as to their impact on 
racial and ethnic minorities, women, children and young people, and people living in 
poverty.  
 Scientific approach to regulated markets: Move gradually toward regulated drug markets 
and apply the scientific method to their evaluation. While regulated legal drug markets are 
not politically possible in the short term in some places, the harms of criminal markets and 
other consequences of prohibition catalogued in this report are likely to lead more countries 
(and more US states) to move gradually in that direction, a direction we endorse. As those 
decisions are taken, we urge governments and researchers to apply the scientific method and 
ensure independent, multidisciplinary and rigorous evaluation of regulated markets to draw 
lessons and inform improvements in regulatory practices, and to continue evaluating and 
improving.  
 
We urge health professionals in all countries to inform themselves and join debates on drug 
policy at all levels. True to the stated goals of the international drug control regime, it is possible 
to have drug policy that contributes to the health and well-being of humankind, but not without 
bringing to bear the evidence of the health sciences and the voices of health professionals. 
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“We must consider alternatives to criminalization and incarceration of people who use 
drugs and focus criminal justice efforts on those involved in supply. We should increase 
the focus on public health, prevention, treatment and care, as well as on economic, social 
and cultural strategies.”  
 
         --Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary-General, on World Day Against Drugs, June 26, 
2015 1 
 
Introduction 
 
In 2015, member states of the United Nations in the presence of more than 150 heads of state 
endorsed a set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that were formulated to embody 
founding principles of the UN, including universal human rights and justice for all.2 The SDG 
resolution commits member states to addressing climate change and other large issues in ways 
that are informed by the best scientific research. The SDGs are also based on a notion of human 
security that is not confined to traditional public order authorities but in which health and social 
sectors play an important part. 2 
 
In April 2016, the same UN member states in a General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) 
will take on a social policy challenge that affects millions of lives – what the UN has called the 
“world drug problem”. As with the SDGs, addressing the use, production, and trafficking of 
drugs will challenge the UN to base its policies on the human rights norms that are the bedrock 
of the UN Charter as well as the best scientific evidence at hand. This challenge is significant 
because it is not only the “world drug problem” but also policy responses to drugs that can 
negatively affect human lives and human rights and contradict evidence-based public health 
approaches.  As noted by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, “…Drugs have destroyed 
many people, but wrong policies have destroyed many more.” 3 
 
A 2015 report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights highlights some of the main 
ways in which drug control policies have been responsible for violations of human rights.4 The 
High Commissioner concluded that drug policies, law, and law enforcement have resulted in 
arbitrary arrest, detention and ill treatment of people who use drugs; unjust use of the death 
penalty for drug offenses; cruel and inhuman treatment of PWUD in the guise of “treatment”; 
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racial and ethnic discrimination in drug law enforcement; denial of life-saving care and 
prevention interventions to people who use drugs; excessive use of incarceration as a response to 
minor drug infractions; denial of the cultural rights of indigenous peoples; and poor access to 
opioids and other controlled medicines for pain management and other clinical uses, among other 
human rights violations.  
 
The last General Assembly Special Session on drugs in 1998, under the theme “a drug-free world 
– we can do it!”, endorsed drug control policies based on the idea of elimination or prohibition of 
all use, possession, production, and trafficking of illicit drugs.5 This idea is embodied in national 
law in many countries. The 1998 UNGASS declaration pronounced drugs a “grave threat to the 
health and well-being of all mankind.”5 In this pronouncement it echoed the bedrock treaty of the 
global drug control regime, the widely ratified 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 
which states in its preamble that drug control is motivated principally by concern for “the health 
and welfare of mankind.”6 Neither of these international agreements, however, refers to the 
negative health consequences of pursuing drug prohibition. The time is long overdue for a 
review of the health impacts of these drug policies. The disconnect between drug control policy 
and health outcomes is no longer tenable or credible.  
 
The Johns Hopkins – Lancet Commission on Drug Policy and Health has sought to examine the 
scientific evidence on a broad range of public health issues arising from drug control policy to 
inform a focus on public health as a central consideration in drug policy discussions such as the 
important deliberations of the 2016 UNGASS.   
 
The JHU-Lancet Commission is motivated partly by a concern that drug policies are often 
founded on ideas about drug use and drug dependence that are not scientifically grounded.  Like 
the Single Convention, the declaration from the 1998 UNGASS on drugs, for example, does not 
distinguish between drug use and drug abuse; all use is referred to as abuse.5 Indicating some 
evolution of thinking in the UN if not amongst member states, the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights in his 2015 report, by contrast, found it important to emphasize that “[d]rug use is 
neither a medical condition nor does it necessarily lead to drug dependence” or loss of dignity.4 
The UNODC 2015 annual report concluded that of an estimated 246 million people who used an 
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illicit drug in the past year, some 27 million, or 11% experienced problem drug use, defined as 
drug dependence or drug use disorders.7 The idea that all drug use is dangerous and evil has 
made it difficult to see potentially dangerous drugs in the same light as potentially dangerous 
foods, tobacco, alcohol, and other substances for which the goal of social policy is to reduce 
harms. Harm reduction, an essential element of public health policy, has too often been lost in 
drug policy-making amidst a dominant discourse on the overwhelming evil of drugs. 
 
We hope that this review and analysis of evidence on the health consequences of pursuing 
prohibition of drugs and drug use can inform rights-based policy change. Because language is 
important to drug policy discussions, we include as an annex to this report a glossary of some 
policy-relevant terms.  
 
[open box] 
Box 1: Introducing the Johns Hopkins – Lancet Commission on Drug Policy and Health 
The JHU-Lancet Commission, co-chaired by Professor Adeeba Kamarulzaman of the University 
of Malaya and Professor Michel Kazatchkine, the UN Special Envoy for HIV/AIDS in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia, is composed of 22 experts from a wide range of disciplines and 
professions, and from low-, middle-, and high-income countries. We have reviewed the global 
evidence base on the impacts of drug policy on health outcomes and conducted novel analysis, 
including with mathematical modeling, to further enhance understanding of the complex and 
manifold interactions of dug policy with health, human rights, and wellbeing. The Centre for 
Public Health and Human Rights at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health 
served as the secretariat for the Commission, and scholars and fellows from the Centre also 
served as commissioners and/or analysts. The Commission produced this report with the hope 
that it would enrich discussions at the time of the UN General Assembly Special Session on the 
world drug problem. We intend to continue our work after the UNGASS, especially to continue 
to advocate for evidence-based and health-focused drug policy reform. 
[close box] 
 
Setting the scene: an evolving international debate 
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The international drug control system itself has its origins in decades-old legal instruments 
framed by politics more than science. From the time of the 1912 Hague Opium Convention, 
minimizing the supply of some psychoactive drugs through policing has been the dominant strain 
in international drug law.8 In the decades leading up to the 1961 Single Convention, international 
drug control agreements largely sidestepped issues of demand and consumption.9 The eventual 
solution in the 1961 Single Convention to reserve some quantity of psychoactive substances for 
medical and scientific use did not resolve the issue of social, cultural, and recreational use that 
was not obviously harmful but was not “medical or scientific.”9  
 
In 1998 when the UN members states declared their commitment to a drug-free world, the UN 
estimated that there were an estimated 8 million people in the world who used heroin in the 
previous year, about 13 million who used cocaine, about 30 million who used amphetamine-type 
substances (ATS), and over 135 million “abusers” – that is, users – of cannabis.10 When the 
countries came together after 10 years to review progress toward a “drug-free world” in 2008, 
the UN estimated that 12 million people used heroin, 16 million used cocaine, almost 34 million 
used ATS, and over 165 million used cannabis in the previous year.11 The worldwide area under 
opium poppy cultivation was estimated at about 238,000 ha in 1998, and  in 2008 was 235,700 
ha, a small decline.11  Prohibition as a policy had clearly failed. 
 
In the 2014 statement from the high-level segment of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs 
(CND, the UN’s drug policy body), an important background document for the 2016 UNGASS, 
UN member states stressed the importance of drug policy that is consistent with human rights 
and acknowledged that “law enforcement measures alone” cannot achieve drug control.12  
 
In the lead-up to the 2016 UNGASS, UN agencies were asked to make statements about how 
drug-control policy intersects with their mandates and affects their work. These statements 
signal that high-level thinking in a number of UN agencies reflects some impatience with the 
pursuit of prohibition. The long list of human rights violations associated with drug-control 
measures led the High Commissioner for Human Rights to call for member states to consider 
“removing obstacles to the right to health, including by decriminalizing the personal use and 
possession of drugs.”4 The UN Development Programme welcomed a change away from the 
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dominant “prohibitionist, law enforcement-led and abstinence-based approach.”13 The WHO 
executive board called for a stronger focus on prevention of drug use and treatment and care of 
PWUD in drug policy as well as on reducing the harms of drugs and drug use.14 
 
Outside the UN, debates have also evolved, including in regional bodies such as the Organization 
of American States (OAU) and the European Union. A 2013 OAU report raised the idea that 
dramatic departures from prohibition-based drug control might be the only way to reduce drug-
related violence and criminality in the Americas.15 The Global Commission on Drug Policy 
(GCDP) including a number of former heads of state and other prominent figures; the Latin 
American Commission on Drugs and Democracy, headed by former Brazilian president 
Ferdinand Cardoso; and the West Africa Commission on Drugs, convened by former UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, all called for an end to strict prohibition-oriented policies and for 
decriminalisation of minor drug infractions, among other recommendations.3,16,17 The Global 
Commission on HIV and the Law, convened by UNDP, also included former heads of state and 
other high-level officials, called on national authorities to “decriminalise the possession of drugs 
for personal use, in recognition that the net impact of such sanctions is often harmful to society” 
and to give priority to public health considerations in drug policy.18 By contrast, the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) agreed on an objective of a “drug-free ASEAN” by 
2015,19 in spite of widespread criticism of the unrealistic nature of the goal.20 
 
North America continues to have by far the highest rates of drug consumption and drug-related 
death and morbidity of any region in the world,7 and drug policy in this region tend to influence 
global debates heavily. Between 2002 and 2013, heroin-related overdose deaths quadrupled in 
the US,21 and deaths associated with prescription opioid overdose quadrupled from 1999 to 
2010.22 Reactions to these trends have included calls for greater availability of naloxone, an 
opioid overdose antidote, for increased access to treatment for opioid dependence,23 for greater 
restriction on prescription of opioids.24 Opioid overdose has been found to be a major contributor 
to an almost unprecedented increase in mortality of middle-aged white, non-Hispanic persons in 
the US at a time when mortality in middle age has continued to decline in other populations.25  
Many observers have commented that opioid dependence is attracting policy attention in the US 
for the very reason that it is affecting whites in suburban and rural environments rather than only 
16 
 
inner-city African Americans.26 The policy challenge is to balance meeting the  need to relieve 
pain and suffering with reasonable restrictions on controlled medicines, and without creating 
disparities – racial, economic, or otherwise – in care. 
 
The world has also taken sharp notice of the cannabis legalisation experiences of the US states of 
Washington, Colorado, Oregon, Alaska and the District of Columbia in a country where 
opposition to drug legalisation has been deep, and of the nationwide cannabis legalisation 
experiment in Uruguay.27 The fiscal imperative of reducing incarceration as well as the fear of 
adulterants in cannabis obtained illegally have been part of the debates in the US policy 
changes.28 Though changes in the legal status of cannabis do not signal changes in prohibition-
oriented policies with respect to other drugs in the US, concrete experiences with regulated 
cannabis markets at an important scale provide an opportunity for rigourous evaluations that will 
inform larger drug policy debates.  
 
 
Violence and enforcement of drug prohibition 
 
Since it published its first report on violence and health in 2002,29 WHO has highlighted 
numerous forms of violence as health issues.30 The Global Burden of Disease Study of 2013 
found that interpersonal violence, including all types of violent assault, rose about 18.4 percent 
as a cause of mortality globally from 1990 to 2013.31 The region most affected was Latin 
America where interpersonal violence was among the top five causes of death in 15 countries.31 
The 2014 WHO report on preventing violence discusses violence that is committed as a result of 
drug and alcohol use, but few investigators, including those at WHO, have investigated the 
violence resulting from drug policies.30 
  
A great deal of drug-related violence is associated with the effort by armed criminal groups to 
protect their illicit markets, often against armed police or military or paramilitary forces. Some 
experts have suggested that heavier crackdowns by drug police can lead to major increases in 
violence when disruption of a given criminal network leads rival groups to intensify their efforts 
to capture the territory of the weakened group.32 Mexico and Central and South America have 
borne an enormous burden of drug-related violence. In 2013, the OAS asserted that the transit of 
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illegal drugs through the Americas leaves persistent violence in its wake – “massacres, attacks by 
hired assassins, and cases of people being tortured to death”.15 As the OAS noted, drug 
trafficking is so entwined with other criminal activity that it is not always possible to say that a 
given episode of extra-judicial killing is purely drug-related, but criminal networks dealing in 
drugs are plainly behind much of this carnage.15 In its 2014 global analysis of homicides, 
UNODC noted that the 30% of homicides accounted for by “organized criminal groups and 
gangs” in the Americas, especially Central and South America, dwarf the corresponding 
percentages in other regions (Figure 1).33 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
From UNODC World crime trends, 2014.33 
 
In conventional wars, sexual violence is both a consequence of war and a weapon used to 
terrorise the enemy, and the war on drugs is no exception. UNODC asserts that organised 
criminal networks dominating drug trafficking in Central America regularly use rape with 
impunity as they defend their territories and routes.34 Women and girls who may be hired as low-
level couriers or smugglers experience sexual assault with no recourse.34 There are numerous 
well documented accounts of rape of girls and young women fleeing gang violence in Central 
America and the severe injuries and post-traumatic stress suffered.35 Some observers credit drug-
related violence with increases in femicide in Mexico and Central America as brutal rape and 
killing of women are used to terrorise communities and rival gangs.36,37 
 
Intolerable levels of violence, insecurity, and corruption have led to mass displacement in 
Mexico and Central America, with displacement levels similar to those documented in war 
zones. 38 Displaced individuals, including children, are characterised by uncertain legal status and 
a dearth of services. By one estimate, about 2% of the population of Mexico, some 1.65 million 
people, were displaced because of violence or the risk of violence between 2006 and 2011.38 In a 
publication of the London School of Economics endorsed by five Nobel Prize-winning 
economists and other experts, Atuesta refutes the idea that this migration is largely economic and 
not drug-related, showing that a majority of those leaving violence-ravaged communities in 
Mexico generally move to lower salaries and sometimes no employment opportunities at all.39  
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The case of homicide in Mexico 
The fateful decision of the Calderón government in Mexico in 2006 to use its military in civilian 
areas to fight drug traffickers ushered in an epidemic of violence in many parts of the country 
that also spilled over into Central America.15 The increase in homicides in Mexico since 2006 is 
virtually unprecedented in a country not formally at war. The increases in homicides in some 
parts of the country were so dramatic as to contribute to a reduction in the country’s projected 
life expectancy.42 Another analysis concluded that in the period 2008-2010 in the state of 
Chihuahua, one of the states most heavily affected by drug violence, about 5 years of life 
expectancy was lost for men.43  
 
In July 2015, the Mexican government reported that from 2007 to 2014, there were 164 345 
homicides in the country, with a dramatic increase after 2006. Figure 2 shows a ‘join point’ 
analysis 44 conducted for this report using government data.45 The increase in homicides after 
2006 is highly significant statistically and notable, especially after a long downward trend in 
homicides. No other country in Latin America – and few elsewhere in the world – have seen 
such as rapid increase in mortality in so short a time.46   
 
[FIGURE 2 HERE]  
Data from Mexican National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), 2014.45 
 
Not all of this increase in homicides can be attributed to drug-related violence, but much of it can 
be. One estimate suggested that the drug war-related deaths pushed the national homicide rate up 
by 11 per 100 000, resulting in an overall rate over 80 per 100 000 in heavily affected 
locations.47  Eleven per 100 000 is 2.5 times the total homicide rate in the US in 2014.47 Other 
observers suggest that the contribution of the drug war to overall mortality is readily quantifiable 
because drug-gang homicides bear tangible signatures, such as the use of identifiable weapons as 
well as torture, beheading and other dismemberment, group executions, and mass graves.46 
Though homicides have declined somewhat since 2012, by some estimates homicides 
perpetuated by organised crime continued to increase through 2014.46 
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Drug-related violence in Mexico is not limited to killings and other armed incidents on the street. 
The Commission found that violence by state actors was also seen in the treatment of people in 
Mexico incarcerated for drug-related crimes. Analysis supervised by Commissioner Alejandro 
Madrazo used a probability sample of persons who were in prison for drug crimes (n=479) in 
Mexico during 2002-2012 – thus before and after the military campaign against drugs – from 
eight federal prisons.48 About half of the detainees (n=241) reported having been beaten or 
tortured at some time in their imprisonment. Among these 241, having experienced an act of 
torture or abuse was 1.31 times more likely after the ‘war on drugs’ than before (p < 0.01). As 
shown in Figure 3, being interrogated by the military in prison was also more likely for people 
serving drug sentences after the military involvement (p < 0.0001). Interrogation by the military, 
in turn, was significantly associated with reports of having been tortured or abused. In 
multivariate analysis controlling for sex, number of times interrogated, and geographical 
location, people who were detained after 2006 were 3.63 times more likely to have been 
interrogated by the military while detained (p < 0.0001). As Madrazo has noted, a deleterious 
outcome of the Mexican drug war is the government’s acquisition of special security powers that 
undermine fundamental principles of the country’s constitution and human rights 
responsibilities.49 
 
[FIGURE 3 HERE] 
 
The costs, including health costs, of violence on citizens is vast and profound. Execution-style 
killings are clearly meant to terrorise the population. Living in fear of extreme violence is 
disruptive to the normal functioning of health and social services, education, and civic 
participation. The penetration of all aspects of society by drug trafficking organizations in 
Mexico, Colombia, and a number of Central American countries can corrupt everything from 
elections and local services to sports teams and other recreation.50   
 
Cannabis has been estimated to account for about US $2 billion per year of the revenue of 
Mexican drug cartels, almost as much as the estimated US $2.4 billion from cocaine.51 It is not 
possible to know how the legalisation of cannabis in the US, if it were to spread beyond a few 
states, would affect drug trafficking in Mexico and Central America. Some observers think that 
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even the modest legalisation enacted so far has cut into Mexican cartels’ trade and perhaps 
limited their capacity to disrupt security.52 
   
Mexico is far from alone in registering high rates of homicide linked to enforcement of drug 
prohibition. Colombia’s case is distinct from Mexico’s in that anti-drug efforts were 
superimposed on a lethal internal war, but homicides spiked when counter-narcotics activities 
were most intense.50 Mejía and Restrepo estimate that about 25% of the current homicide rate in 
Colombia is explained by the thriving cocaine markets and the war on drugs in the country. In 
other words, absent the large increase in the size of cocaine markets, Colombia would have had a 
homicide rate in 2008 of about 27 per 100 000 population instead of the observed 37.53 
 
[Figure 4 HERE] 
From Mejía and Restrepo, 2014.50 
 
Mejía and Restrepo characterize these profound problems of homicide and other violence, 
corruption, and forced displacement as a package ‘outsourced’ from the major drug-consuming 
countries, mainly the US, to producer and transit countries.50 That is, in return for a certain 
amount of foreign assistance for counter-narcotics activities, the US in particular keeps the worst 
of the heavy burden of violence, insecurity and displacement outside its borders. (See Box 2.)  
But, as these authors note, this exported pillar of the drug war is beginning to be questioned in 
earnest by some governments in Latin America, as demonstrated by statements criticizing the 
status quo in drug policy by the then presidents of Mexico, Colombia, and Guatemala in the UN 
General Assembly in 2012 which moved the 2016 UNGASS from 2019.54  
 
[open box] 
Box 2:  Exporting drug-related violence:  A thought experiment 
By Daniel Mejía and Pascual Restrepo50 
 
To illustrate the exportation of violence in the current situation in Mexico and Central America, 
consider the following scenario:  suppose that cocaine consumption in the US disappears and is 
displaced to Canada, but cocaine continues to pass through the US. Because of its international 
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treaty obligations, the US is obliged to do everything in its power to keep cocaine from passing 
through its borders to Canadian cities. Canada shares some of the cost of this effort, but the result 
of fighting the cocaine cartels is that the homicide rate in Seattle spikes from its current level of 
about 5 homicides per 100,000 population to over 100 to keep cocaine from reaching Vancouver.  
Similar violence seizes other border cities, and a massive wave of internal displacement in the 
northern US challenges social services and stability of governance.  Even if the Canadian 
government shared the costs to the tune of billions of dollars per year, how long would such a 
situation be tolerated? 
[Close box] 
 
Drug policy and infectious diseases 
 
HIV, HCV, harm reduction and drug policy: neglect of proven solutions 
At a time when gains in reduction of sexual transmission of HIV are evident worldwide, HIV 
transmission linked to injection of drugs with unsterile equipment continues to drive HIV 
incidence in many regions, including Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EECA) and much of 
Asia, in spite of the availability of proven interventions to stop it.55,56 The prevalence of HIV 
among PWID is many times higher than in the general population in many countries (Figure 5).57 
Outside sub-Saharan Africa an estimated 30% of HIV transmission is linked to unsafe 
injection.57 Drug injection is a more important determinant of HIV transmission in EECA than in 
any other region.58 While HIV incidence declined by 35% globally from 2000 to 2014, new 
infections increased by 30% in that period in EECA, where unsafe drug injection accounts for 
over 65% of cumulated cases.58  
 
FIGURE 5 HERE 
From UNAIDS, Gap report, 2014.57 
 
WHO estimates that about two thirds of PWID in the world are living with hepatitis C virus 
(HCV) infection, a much higher percentage than the estimated 13% living with HIV.59  WHO 
notes that EECA, sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia are particularly affected,59 though data are 
not regularly kept in some countries. In high-income and upper-middle-income countries 
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generally a high percentage of new HCV infections are among PWID.59 A seminal study in the 
US found that over half of PWID were infected with HCV in their first year of injecting.60 An 
estimated 20-30% of people living with HIV have HCV coinfection, but the coinfection rate 
amongst PWID is estimated at 90%.61 
 
An extensive body of research has demonstrated that there are effective tools for preventing HIV 
and HCV among people who use drugs by injection and other means.  Rigorous reviews of this 
research have informed strong recommendations by WHO, UNAIDS, and UNODC for 
comprehensive services for PWUD,62 which include these elements: 
1. Needle and syringe programmes including other injection equipment; 
2. Opioid substitution therapy and other drug dependence treatment; 
3. HIV testing and counselling; 
4. Antiretroviral therapy; 
5. Prevention and treatment of sexually transmitted infections; 
6. Condom programmes for PWUD and their sexual partners; 
7. Targeted information, education and communication for PWUD and their sexual 
partners; 
8. Vaccination, diagnosis and treatment of viral hepatitis; and 
9. Prevention, diagnosis and treatment of tuberculosis.  
 
Needle and syringe programmes (NSP):  Programmes that provide PWID with sterile injection 
equipment – often in the form of exchange programmes in which used equipment is traded for 
sterile equipment – are a crucial part of prevention services and decreasing circulation time of 
contaminated syringes. WHO found that NSP, particularly low-threshold (easy-access) exchange 
programmes, were effective in reducing HIV transmission and were not associated with 
increased injection frequency or initiation of new injection among persons not already injecting 
drugs.63 A recent meta-analysis estimated that NSP reduced HIV transmission by about 58%, 
though with caveats about the quality of some studies and the difficulty of disentangling the 
effect of NSP from that of other services.64  
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As the high HCV prevalence among PWID indicates, HCV is transmitted more efficiently than 
HIV through unsafe injection.  Evidence from controlled trials on the effectiveness of NSP in 
HCV prevention is more equivocal than for HIV.65 Part of the challenge is that some people new 
to drug injection will be HCV-infected even before they begin to take advantage of NSP 
services. NSP is most effective in HCV prevention when coverage is very high, reaching people 
from a time close to when they first inject.66  
 
Opioid substitution therapy (OST):  There is repeated reference in this report to the opioid 
agonists methadone and buprenorphine, which are the oral medicines most commonly used in 
medication-assisted treatment of opioid dependence, referred to as OST.  OST plays a dual role 
as treatment for opioid dependence, which can help stabilize lives with all of the attendant 
benefits, and as HIV and HCV prevention because when effective, it eliminates injection. There 
is arguably no form of treatment of any drug dependence that has as vast a scientific evidence 
base or as long a successful clinical experience as OST.67 In both its treatment and harm 
reduction roles, OST faces drug policy impediments because the medicines used are heavily 
regulated in most countries. Countries do not always allocate adequate quantities of these oral 
opioid medicines for OST, and doctors in some countries are reluctant to prescribe them for fear 
of prosecution if there is diversion of these medicines to non-medical use. 
 
A 2012 meta-analysis from Europe, North America, and Asia concluded that oral OST, 
methadone maintenance in particular, reduces risk of HIV transmission among people who inject 
opioids by about 54%.67 A 2014 ‘review of reviews’ concluded that the evidence is strong for 
OST’s HIV prevention impact, particularly where doses of opioid agonists are adequate.65  
Observational studies from San Francisco, the UK, Scotland, Vancouver and Sydney found that 
OST use was associated with dramatically reduced risk of HCV acquisition among PWID,66,68-70 
with the data from Scotland, Amsterdam  and the UK also concluding that combined OST with 
NSP further reduces the risk of HCV acquisition.66,71,72  A model analysis based on data from the 
UK illustrates that if enough people can get access to OST and to sufficient sterile injection 
equipment for virtually every injection, HCV transmission could decline substantially (Figure 
6).73  
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[FIGURE 6 here] 
From Vickerman et al., 2012.73 
 
In spite of the very large body of evidence of the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of opioid 
agonist therapy, some countries insist that generating new research in their settings is necessary 
before scaling up OST. For these and other reasons, OST has remained in a “perpetual pilot” 
mode in a number of countries.74  
 
Access to OST in Western Europe is a positive contrast to most other regions, with a number of 
Western European countries virtually eliminating HIV from unsafe injection as a public health 
concern by scaling up NSP and OST as well as treatment for HIV.75 Unlike their counterparts in 
Western Europe, EECA countries generally have inadequate coverage, quality, and accessibility 
of NSP and limited or no access to OST.76,77  
 
Gains have been made in harm reduction policy and practice in some of the Asian countries with 
large populations of PWUD. In China, Malaysia, and Vietnam, zero tolerance of harm reduction 
has given way to government-supported OST and sometimes NSP.56 China was estimated in 
2015 have been serving about 200 000 OST patients,58 but this still represented a small 
percentage of people who might benefit, and the problems of high drop-out rates and low 
dosages remained challenging.56 By a 2015 estimate, Vietnam was reaching 32 000 OST patients 
in 44 provinces in a country with an estimated 130 000 PWID.78 Though coverage may be 
relatively low, the existence and continued growth of these programmes are important 
achievements.  
 
While it is advantageous with respect to HIV prevention that coverage levels of these measures 
be as high as possible, an important body of research demonstrates that if OST, NSP, and HIV 
treatment are all present their synergistic effect can compensate for partial coverage. Figure 7 
illustrates this point using data from Dushanbe, Tajikistan. In this case, if needle exchange and 
ART alone are available, a 50% decrease in HIV incidence over a 10-year period requires that 
the coverage of both programmes be about 30%.79 But if ART, NSP, and OST are all available, a 
50% decline in HIV incidence over this period can be achieved with 20% coverage of these 
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interventions.79 Similar results have been found in other settings.55,80 Therefore partial coverage 
of OST, NSP, and ART may provide effective prevention if it is not possible to attain very high 
ART coverage, which may be especially challenging where people who use drugs are 
criminalised.  
 
FIGURE 7 here 
From Vickerman et al., 2014.79 
 
HIV and HCV treatment: HIV testing with a link to treatment is important for all people. For 
PWUD as for other populations, ART can suppress viraemia and lower transmission risks. ART 
coverage for PWUD is high in Western Europe, North America and Australasia, but it was not 
always so. In the early years of ART availability, HIV-positive people who used drugs had to 
battle scientifically unfounded ideas that excluded them from treatment programmes. One was 
that the lives of people who use drugs are too chaotic to allow them to adhere to daily multi-pill 
treatment regimens,81 although research had shown that PWUD can adhere to ART and achieve 
viral suppression.82 It took more research in several settings and the experience of successfully 
expanded treatment programmes for PWUD to dispel these ideas.83  
 
Studies from a number of settings have reported that agonist treatment for opioid dependence 
improves ART adherence among PWUD.83 In Vancouver, Canada, several longitudinal studies 
showed not only that OST continuation improved ART adherence over time,84 but also the 
converse – that OST discontinuation significantly increased the risk of ART non-adherence85 – 
and that OST patients with higher opioid agonist doses had the strongest adherence to ART.86  In 
China, the understanding of the importance of the OST-ART link led to an effort to integrate 
ART services in methadone clinics.87 While a number of practical challenges were encountered, 
the effort showed an appreciation for the value of integrating these areas of care.  In Ukraine, 
patients having access to integrated and co-located ART and OST services had greater access to 
ART than those receiving OST in non-integrated facilities.88 
 
In places where there is significant HIV transmission linked to unsafe injection, denying 
treatment to HIV-positive PWUD both ensures that they and their injection and sex partners will 
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be at risk of HIV and violates the rights of all concerned. Nonetheless, PWUD seem to be 
systematically excluded from ART in many parts of the world. A 2014 review of HIV services in 
the countries with the largest number of people who inject drugs estimated that in both China and 
Malaysia, less than 5% of PWUD living with HIV had access to treatment, and in the Russian 
Federation about 1%.56  There is relatively poor access to HIV testing and ART in EECA, due at 
least in some places to fear of police harassment or arrest, as well as to systematic exclusion of 
PWUD from treatment programmes.89 UNAIDS’ 2014 report on gaps in the global HIV response 
summarises the crisis of inaccessibility of ART for PWID, also noting that less than 1% of HIV-
positive PWID in Africa receives ART (Figure 8).57  
  
[FIGURE 8 HERE] 
From UNAIDS, Gap report 2014.57 
 
People who use drugs in many parts of the world have no access to HCV screening and 
treatment. Unlike HIV, HCV infection can be cured and cleared from the body. Interferon-based 
therapies as the treatment of choice are giving way to direct-acting antivirals (DAA) marketed 
since 2013. The cost of the DAAs, however, is orders of magnitude greater than interferon-based 
therapy.90 There is an urgent need for measures to reduce the price of the new generation of 
hepatitis C medicines and to ensure that PWUD can benefit from these treatments. In this regard, 
there may be many applicable lessons from the well documented efforts that succeeded in 
bringing down the prices of HIV medicines.91 
 
For PWUD, cost is far from the only barrier to being able to benefit from DAA therapies (see 
Figure 9). Policy-making on HCV treatment is replaying a number of misinformed tropes from 
the HIV past, including the idea that PWUD – or even those with any history of drug use – do 
not adhere well to treatment and are not worthy of expensive care.92 This non-adherence myth 
was disproven with respect to HIV treatment, which usually requires a lifetime regimen of 
several medicines, and it has been researched and equally disproven with respect to HCV 
therapies, which are much shorter in duration.92 Requiring abstinence from drugs or alcohol 
before initiating HCV treatment, a condition already established in many US states, is also not 
scientifically justified and excludes underserved and needy persons from care.92 It has also been 
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suggested that active drug users are poor candidates for HCV treatment because they are likely to 
be reinfected, but several studies disprove this assertion.92,93 None of these claims should stand in 
the way of comprehensive HCV prevention and treatment for PWID. WHO along with many 
professional liver and infectious disease associations urge HCV screening and treatment of 
PWUD as a public health priority.92,93 Modeling analyses have indicated that HCV treatment for 
PWID could be an effective and cost-effective means of HCV prevention,94,95 and that 
combination prevention strategies incorporating OST, NSP and HCV treatment could 
dramatically reduce HCV incidence and prevalence among PWID in a range of settings.96 
 
FIGURE 9 HERE 
From Wolfe et al., 2015.97 
 
Condom programmes:  Unsafe injection-linked transmission of HIV sometimes overshadows 
sexual transmission in programme priorities for PWUD, but both are essential. UN reports and 
research in many settings have for years highlighted the importance of condom programmes for 
all men who have sex with men (MSM), and particularly those who use drugs either to enhance 
sexual pleasure, to lower sexual inhibitions, to escape or cope with situations of discrimination, 
persecution, or uncertainty about sexuality, or for other reasons.98,99 Many studies have 
demonstrated a link between drug use at the time of sexual activity (‘sexualized drug use’) and 
lower condom use, resulting in a higher prevalence of HIV and other sexually transmitted 
diseases and lower incidence of condom use.99-101 But more work is needed in many settings to 
understand the complex motivations for sexual decision-making that would inform effective 
condom promotion programmes.102   
 
The UN recommendations do not include a number of interventions for which an evidence base 
exists to justify their contribution to an HIV or HCV response. Supervised injection sites are an 
example. In a number of European countries, Australia and Canada, there are legally sanctioned 
indoor locations where people can inject (and sometimes smoke and inhale) illegal drugs under 
medical supervision, obtain clean equipment, be referred to OST and learn HIV and overdose 
prevention education. The harm reduction intended by these facilities is not only with respect to 
HIV transmission but also to prevent mortality and other adverse outcomes of overdose, as well 
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as to reduce unsafe disposal of syringes.75 A recent meta-analysis reported a 69% reduction in 
syringe sharing resulting from use of supervised injection sites.103 In the case of Insite, the 
supervised injection facility in Vancouver, Canada, a conservative estimate indicates that on the 
sole grounds of HIV cases averted, Insite more than pays for itself, and savings are even greater 
if one takes into account behavioral change leading to use of sterile syringes outside Insite.104 
 
As noted by Coffin and colleagues, research on pre-exposure prophylaxis (PreP) using tenofovir, 
an important newer HIV prevention measure, has often excluded PWUD.105 Nonetheless, an 
important PreP trial reported in the Lancet amongst PWID in Bangkok demonstrated an HIV 
prevention effect for both men and women who inject drugs.106  
  
The cost in HIV and HCV transmission of neglecting harm reduction and prevention 
measures 
Preventable outbreaks of HIV in recent years have constituted graphic real-life demonstration of 
the value of ready access to harm reduction services and the cost of impeding access to them. 
EECA bear a heavy burden from the neglect of harm reduction measures. Harsh anti-drug 
policies and moral judgments against PWUD contribute to making health services for this 
population a low political priority.89 In the first decade of its work, financial support from the 
Global Fund helped to overcome these difficult political environments and supported the 
expansion of harm reduction services, especially NSP and OST, in a number of EECA countries 
as well as in East and Southeast Asia.107 However, with changes in Global Fund policy that have 
eliminated or reduced funding for middle-income countries, some of these services have been cut 
(see Box 3 below).108   
 
[open box] 
Box 3: Funding crisis for HIV-related harm reduction 
In pure fiscal terms, preventing HIV through harm reduction measures should be an easy sell. 
Cost-effectiveness is high, and start-up costs for these services are low. But harm reduction 
continues to be resisted as a funding priority in too many countries. Support by the Global Fund 
in its first decade, however, inspired some countries that had not previously scaled up NSP and 
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OST to do so, particularly in EECA.107 The Global Fund encouraged the inclusion of HIV 
prevention services for PWID and other “key populations” in country proposals.108 
 
In the first ten funding rounds of the Global Fund plus a special transitional funding period, some 
$620 million in grant support went to programmes for PWIUD in 55 countries, an unprecedented 
wave of life-saving support for a politically unpopular population.108 When the official country 
proposal to the Global Fund in Thailand, for example, excluded programmes for PWUD in spite 
of high HIV prevalence in that population, the Global Fund made a special grant to NGOs that 
were able to bring services directly to the community.109  
 
In 2013, the Global Fund unveiled a “new funding model” that, unlike its previous processes, 
assigned ceiling amounts to countries and significantly limited funding to most middle-income 
countries, even those with severe injection-linked epidemics where it was unlikely that 
governments would pick up the costs of the newly scaled-up programmes.110 Romania lost 
funding at a key moment (see main text); Serbia’s harm reduction programmes are operating on 
a shoestring;111 programmes in Ukraine – a country with over 350 000 PWID – are gravely 
threatened;110 and Vietnam may suffer a similar fate.108 Thailand is no longer eligible for support. 
 
Civil society advocacy continues for governments to provide the funding no longer available 
from the Global Fund,112 but it is clear that when it comes to politics harm reduction will remain 
a hard sell in many places.  
[close box] 
 
In 2010-2012, of the 27 European Union member states plus Norway, Iceland and Turkey, it was 
estimated that Romania and Greece accounted for one third of all the HIV incidence among 
PWID, the two countries together having seen a 20-fold increase in new HIV diagnoses linked to 
drug injection.113  In Romania the reduction in external support for harm reduction services 
coincided with the availability of relatively inexpensive amphetamine-type “legal highs” – new 
psychoactive substances (NPS) not yet under legal control. Some people who previously injected 
heroin shifted their consumption to these new stimulants. But heroin is injected two or three 
times a day, and the stimulants six to ten times.113 NPS use was found to be associated with 
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syringe sharing and high-risk sexual practices to a greater degree than heroin use. The number of 
persons injecting drugs is estimated to have risen from about 17 000 in 2008 to about 20 000 in 
2011 – and with riskier and more frequent injection114 – and harm reduction services were 
largely curtailed in 2010. NGOs ran effective NSP and OST services that kept HIV low until 
then, but funding from the Global Fund was lost when Romania joined the EU.108 The dramatic 
rise in HIV cases through 2013 is shown in Figure 10, representing cases at a major hospital in 
Bucharest, which practitioners judged to mirror the national situation. Among the newly infected 
PWID, about 20% were estimated to be injecting heroin, 20% NPS, and 20% a combination of 
the two.115 As UNAIDS has noted, HIV outbreaks among PWID tend to be dramatically fast-
growing.56  
 
[FIGURE 10 HERE] 
 
From Dr Christina Oprea, Victor Babes Hospital, Bucharest, 2015.115 
 
 
In Greece, even before the severe economic recession of 2008-09, harm reduction services for 
PWUD were provided at a relatively low level of coverage.116 The recession was associated with 
impoverishment and dramatic increases in homelessness among PWID, which separated some 
people even more from existing services and funding to existing NSP services was cut 
significantly.117 After years of fewer than 20 new cases of HIV transmission among PWID in the 
country, in 2011 the number of new cases of HIV linked to injection was 260 and in 2012 it 
jumped to 522.116 With assistance from the European Union, Greece scaled up low-threshold 
harm reduction services, including in cities that had not had them previously, and existing 
services got support to distribute low-dead-space syringes, which reduce HIV transmission 
risk.118 
 
For most of the period since the emergence of HIV as a public health problem, the US 
government banned the use of federal funds for NSP, though some states and municipalities 
supported them.119  In January 2016, the US Congress lifted that ban for all NSP program costs 
other than needles and syringes, a move seen by many as a response to an increasingly visible 
opioid injection problem even outside major urban areas.120 In 2015, a rural county in the US 
state of Indiana experienced a dramatic increase in HCV infection followed by a linked outbreak 
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of HIV cases linked to injection of oxymorphone, a synthetic opioid.121 Some 135 persons were 
infected with HIV in a short time in a district that previously had reported very few HIV cases. 
Almost half the new infections were among women, and they spanned a wide age range as it was 
found that injection took place in multi-generational groups.121 Indiana did not permit needle and 
syringe programmes before the outbreak--non-medical use of syringes was a felony punishable 
by up to three years in prison.119 The governor of Indiana changed the state’s policy to allow 
NSP services for a year on the basis of a public health emergency.119  Similar outbreaks of HCV 
among PWID have been reported across this region, including in Kentucky, and West Virginia, 
all states with limited or no NSP, and with limited access to OST.119  
 
For policy-makers interested in hard numbers on the value of comprehensive HIV and HCV 
prevention, the cost savings associated with these services are considerable. The government of 
Australia, for example, which has invested significantly in harm reduction from the early years 
of HIV, estimated that for every dollar spent on NSP, more than $4 was gained in short-term (10-
year) savings on health care costs, and over a longer period where coverage has been maintained, 
as much as $27 is gained.122 A World Bank study in Malaysia, where about two thirds of HIV 
transmission is related to unsafe injection, concluded that over the long term NSP in that country 
even at a relatively low rate of coverage would give a more than threefold return on 
investment.123 Other studies have shown that needle and syringe programmes can also help refer 
people to treatment for HIV and drug dependence and other services.124, 125 A 2015 review 
suggests that the low cost of these programmes and the high cost of the HIV suffering and 
treatment that NSP can avert means that NSP are “one of the most cost-effective interventions 
ever funded.”124 
 
Commenting on the cost-effectiveness of OST, WHO, UNODC and UNAIDS UN asserted both 
the effectiveness and the cost-effectiveness of OST with respect to HIV, noting that for every 
dollar spent on it, a return of $4-7 could be expected due to crime reduction alone and a return of 
about $12 if health-care savings are included.126 Although OST is more expensive per person 
than NSP, Wilson and colleagues assert in their review that OST is highly cost-effective not only 
in HIV prevention terms but because of health savings linked to less relapse, reduced 
incarceration, and a wide range of quality of life improvements.124  
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The impact of law and law enforcement on HIV and HCV services 
Evidence from a number of countries indicates that drug law, policy, and law enforcement 
practices can be barriers to provision and use of harm reduction and other HIV prevention 
services. These barriers take many forms, a few related to the letter of the law in force in a 
country – the “law on the books” -- but many more related to the way in which law is enforced in 
practice, or what Burris calls the “law on the street”.127  Some of these are the following: 
 
“Law on the books”   
Banning OST and NSP:  In some cases, there are legal prohibitions against or poor legal 
grounding for harm reduction services for PWID. The case of the Russian Federation is extreme: 
OST is prohibited by law though opioid injection is widespread, and NSP have been allowed 
only sporadically and are generally not supported by the state.128 The official estimate of 
Russians living with HIV rose to 907 000 by end 2014, up almost 7% from 2013 figures and up 
from 500 000 in 2010.129 Over 57% of new cases were attributed to unsafe drug injection. NSPs 
are banned by law or effectively blocked by policy, including zoning restrictions, in many 
jurisdictions.76 
 
Laws and law enforcement practices limiting OST and NSP:  While OST may not be banned 
outright or explicitly, in some countries methadone and buprenorphine, the medicines used most 
in OST, may not be registered or authorized for this use.76 This problem persists in spite of the 
inclusion of methadone and buprenorphine on the WHO Model List of Essential Medicines and 
strong support from WHO for OST. There are many other ways in which drug-control laws or 
regulations limit the use or usefulness of OST, including arbitrary restrictions on numbers of 
patients; arbitrary limitation of dosages and the duration of treatment; prohibition of take-home 
doses; periods of drug or alcohol abstinence or having to try other kinds of treatment as a 
prerequisite to starting OST; limiting the neighborhoods or geographical zones where OST 
services can be offered;  lack of integration with accessible community health services so that 
people have to make special trips for OST; and lack of access to OST in prison and pretrial 
detention.76,130 In a number of countries there is relatively good access to OST in the community 
but none offered to people in prison or other detention.76 
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As with OST, NSP not banned outright can be undermined by various laws and policies.  
According to a 2014 estimate by Harm Reduction International, significant drug injection is 
reported in 158 countries, but only 90 have functioning NSP, most of which have very low 
coverage.76 Laws, policies or local ordinances may limit NSP to remote or unpleasant 
neighborhoods; limit the hours of operation or permitted geographic coverage; limit the number 
of needles or syringes that can be exchanged or require one-to-one exchange in every transaction 
(that is, getting clean syringes requires producing the same number of used syringes); limit the 
age of NSP participants; and limit or forbid provision of clean injection equipment in prison and 
pretrial detention.76 In the US, the 50 states have a dizzying array of laws and regulations 
regarding needle exchange. In some jurisdictions, local health authorities have to declare 
emergencies periodically to continue to justify NSP; some states simply ban these services.76   
 
In many countries, drug paraphernalia laws undermine NSP, often prohibiting the possession of 
syringes. In the Global Fund-supported project known as CHAMPION (2008-2013), which was 
meant to help address the high prevalence of HIV among PWID in Thailand, evaluators reported 
that an important impediment to scaling up NSP was that PWID feared carrying syringes.131 
They reported that being caught with syringes could lead to arrest, detention, forced drug 
treatment, and obligatory urine testing.  
 
In some countries health workers are required or strongly encouraged to register PWUD, and 
registries are turned over to the police (see web appendix I). 
 
“Law on the street” 
Possession of injection equipment:  In some places, there is no legal prohibition of possession 
of drug paraphernalia, but police nonetheless use possession of injection equipment as grounds 
for stop-and-search, arrest, and detention.  For example, among nearly 600 Russians living with 
HIV surveyed in 2014, over 50% reported having been arrested for possessing a syringe (or 
having a syringe planted on them by the police), though it is not against the law in the Russian 
Federation to possess a syringe.128 Those reporting such arrests were more likely to have shared 
needles with others and to have suffered an overdose than those not arrested.128 This quantitative 
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study corroborates qualitative accounts suggesting that repressive policing in the Russian 
Federation in many ways raises HIV risk and discourages seeking out and using the few HIV 
prevention services that may exist.132 In a number of countries, even if syringe possession is 
legal, police routinely seize injection equipment that they find, further undermining protection of 
health.75 Police presence was associated with unsafe rushed injection among PWID in Bangkok 
in a multivariate analysis,133 and a small sample of PWID in Hai Phong, Vietnam, reported 
greater likelihood of needle sharing and other risky practices when police were present or their 
presence was feared.134  
 
Police targeting harm reduction services:  The performance of drug police in many countries 
is judged by the number of arrests they make, and PWUD are likely to be easier to find to help 
bolster arrest totals than major drug traffickers. It is perhaps for this reason that police may target 
facilities providing health and harm reduction services to PWUD.135 A 2015 study involving over 
500 methadone patients conducted by NGO service providers in New York City found that 38% 
of the patients reported being stopped and searched by police outside the clinics where they 
received methadone, and 70% reported witnessing someone else being searched in these 
locations.136 In some countries, extortion of bribes from PWUD may be an important source of 
income for poorly paid police.137 
 
Crackdowns and other intensive policing: Crackdowns and other intensive policing, often 
targeting low-income, minority, or marginalized persons, can undermine harm reduction and add 
to drug-related risk. During a crackdown on drug use known as “Operation 24/7” in Vancouver, 
Canada in 2003, researchers documented a significant decline in access to sterile injection 
equipment as police actions drove PWID away from the only NSP open at night.138 During 
police crackdowns in Australia, PWUD reportedly switched from inhalation or smoking of 
substances to injection, which is much riskier, partly because during crackdowns drugs became 
scarcer and injection could be accomplished with lower quantities of drugs as well as more 
quickly and less visibly than smoking.139 Other studies have shown that crackdowns lead to 
rushed injections, more vascular accidents, and the likelihood that steps such as disinfecting the 
injection site will be skipped.140 In Malaysia, rushing an injection because of police presence was 
found to be linked to risk of overdose.141     
35 
 
 
Tuberculosis, drug use and drug policy 
According to WHO, tuberculosis is the single most important cause of death among people 
living with HIV, responsible for one in four deaths.142 People living with HIV have a 30-fold 
higher risk of TB infection than HIV-negative persons.142 But WHO emphasizes that PWUD are 
at very high risk of both infection with Mycobacterium tuberculosis and TB disease even if they 
do not live with HIV; the risk of TB linked independently to drug injection – and even to non-
injection drug use – was well established before HIV was in the picture.143  
 
WHO estimates that people who both live with HIV and inject drugs are two to six times more 
likely than HIV-positive people who do not inject drugs to contract TB.144 But the role of drug 
use in the epidemiology of TB is complex and, as noted by Deiss and colleagues, the existing 
literature does not always distinguish drug injection from other drug use.145 Many elements of 
the risk environment of at least some people who use drugs – homelessness or sub-standard 
housing, heavy alcohol and tobacco use, and incarceration, for example – are risk factors for TB. 
Some studies suggest that people who use drugs present later than other persons to seek TB 
testing or care.145 Deiss and colleagues also raise the possibility that use of opioids may inhibit 
the cough reflex and thus mask symptoms of TB that might otherwise lead to seeking care.145  
 
Multi-drug-resistant TB (MDR-TB) has threatened to undermine progress in TB control in many 
parts of the world.146 The region with the highest documented proportion of MDR-TB among TB 
cases is EECA, also home to major unsafe injection-linked HIV and HCV epidemics.142 
Remarkably, though HIV-HCV coinfection is high in the region, HIV-TB coinfection is 
reportedly low, but experts warn that with the combination of sparse harm reduction services, 
low ART coverage among people who use drugs, high rates of incarceration of people who use 
drugs, non-integrated vertical health services, and substandard housing and social support, a 
perfect storm of HIV-MDR-TB coinfection may be brewing.147 
 
WHO recommends that PWUD be included systematically in anti-TB efforts and especially that 
HIV, HCV and TB services be integrated and low-threshold for people who use drugs.144 The 
reality, however, is that recommended services remain out of reach for many people who use 
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drugs worldwide. Diagnosis of TB with microscopy identifying acid-fast TB bacilli and 
molecular DNA detection using geneXpert systems is recommended,144 but in Central Asia, for 
example, TB diagnosis is still made mostly using chest radiography147 though x-ray results are 
compromised by the presence of HIV.144  
 
WHO has compiled detailed guidance for integrated treatment of TB and HIV as well as TB and 
HCV, including ensuring sustained access to ART for all who need it.148 The exclusion of 
PWUD from ART, which persists in many parts of the world, undermines the effectiveness of 
TB treatment as well as HCV treatment.  
 
The importance of integrated and sustained care cannot be overstated. Deiss and colleagues 
report cases in which TB treatment was integrated with treatment for drug dependence but was 
lost after people left drug treatment.145 The NGO Partners in Health addressed the challenge of 
keeping people who use drugs in sustained care for MDR-TB in a programme called Sputnik in 
Tomsk, Russian Federation, through a strategy of intensive accompaniment of patients.149 
Trained teams of nurses, drivers, and others worked with patients to ensure delivery of treatment 
in places and circumstances that the patient could maintain to minimize missed appointments. 
Family, friends, and neighbors were helped to understand the importance of treatment and to 
provide support to patients.149 Over 70% of high-risk patients completed treatment. The cost 
compared to hospitalization was small. A study in Malaysia demonstrated that TB screening and 
care in drug rehabilitation centres and facilities offering OST was a very effective targeting 
strategy.150  
 
TB and drug use experts at WHO, writing in 2013 in the WHO Bulletin, asserted that it was 
urgent to address the undermining role of “punitive drug policies and laws in fueling the 
tuberculosis epidemic among people who use drugs”.151 Not only do punitive laws drive PWUDs 
away from health services, they may also contribute to stigmatising or disrespectful treatment in 
health services.151 For these reasons, in its 2014 guidance on HIV services for “key populations” 
including PWUD, WHO recommended decriminalisation of drug use as well as training and 
protections for health workers to reduce fear of treating PWID.152  
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Drug-related incarceration and health 
 
Use of incarceration in drug control 
In 2014, UNODC estimated that persons convicted of drug crimes make up about 21% of 
incarcerated persons worldwide. Possession defined, by UNODC as possession of drugs for 
individual use, was the most frequently reported crime globally (Figure 11).32 Based on data 
from 2011 annual country reports, UNODC estimated that drug possession offenses constituted 
83% of drug offenses reported worldwide.32 While not all of the crimes reported by the police 
result in incarceration, mandatory prison sentences are attached to possession of even a small 
amount of drugs in many countries. In some countries that have decriminalised drug use, 
possession for individual use remains an offense, or the amount defined for non-criminalised 
individual use is so low that possession is effectively a crime.153 
 
UNAIDS estimates that in places where drug use and small-scale drug possession are criminal 
offenses, the majority of people who use drugs may wind up in the custody of the state at some 
time in their lives.57 In Central Asia, one estimate suggests that more than 50% of PWID have 
been arrested at least one time.77 Though there have been some reform efforts, many countries 
have drug laws that impose extended custodial sentences on people convicted of non-violent 
offenses including drug use alone, possession of amounts of drugs intended only for individual 
use, and sale of very small amounts of drugs.76 The over-representation of PWUD in prison and 
the lack of essential care and support for them while in state custody are amongst the most 
devastating health legacies of pursuing drug prohibition. There is, moreover, no evidence that 
incarceration is an effective deterrent for drug use either in prison or afterward.154 Indeed, the 
Vancouver Injection Drug User Study (VIDUS), a long-running cohort study, found that recent 
incarceration was negatively associated with cessation of injection.155 
 
Several studies conclude that criminal prosecution of minor use and possession infractions does 
not have the deterrent effect with respect to drug use, possession, or minor crimes that supporters 
of these sanctions claim.  A classic study comparing cannabis use in San Francisco and 
Amsterdam – cities with very different approaches to cannabis regulation – found that the partial 
decriminalisation of cannabis in Amsterdam was not associated with increased use or possession, 
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and the rigorous criminalisation in San Francisco was not associated with reductions in use or 
possession.156   
 
[FIGURE 11 HERE] 
From UNODC, World crime trends, 2014.33 
 
The OAS in its landmark 2013 report on drugs and drug policy in the Americas lamented the 
dramatic rise in prison populations especially linked to prosecution of minor offenses because 
they are less likely than major traffickers to be able to afford legal assistance in attaining “access 
to justice”.15 This increase, at least in some Latin American countries, is a detrimental outcome 
of steady increases in legislated penalties for drug offenses since the 1950s (Figure 12). 157 (See 
also web appendix II.) 
 
[FIGURE 12 HERE] 
From Uprimny et al., 2013.157 
 
Table 1 shows the most recent information for selected countries on the proportion of people 
incarcerated for drug offenses among all incarcerated persons. UNODC’s data on the 
prominence of possession offenses and the data informing Table 1 do not distinguish the 
proportion of drug-related offenders who are incarcerated for minor, non-violent offenses. But, 
as noted by Penal Reform International in a 2015 report, mandatory prison sentences are attached 
to possession of even a small amount of drugs in many countries.160 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
From Penal Reform International;158 Giacomello, 2014;159  OAS-CIM report, 2014;160   US Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, 2015;161 Perez Correa and Azeola, 201248  
 
[open box] 
Box 4:  The death penalty for drug offenses 
June 26 is designated by the UN as the International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit 
Trafficking. The day has been “celebrated” in some countries by holding public executions of 
drug offenders.162 Some 32 countries have laws on the books that impose capital penalties for 
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drug offenses.163 But most drug-related use of the death penalty is by a smaller number of 
countries including China, Iran, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Thailand.163 
 
Advocacy for the abolition of the death penalty has succeeded globally in general as many 
countries have removed it from their books in the last 50 years. But in the same period a number 
of countries included definition of capital crimes in their drug laws.163 The Single Convention of 
1961 may have influenced some countries; the commentary accompanying it suggests that 
capital punishment for drug offenses is an appropriate sanction.164 The 1988 UN drug convention 
with its strong emphasis on criminal penalties for drug trafficking may also be an influence.165 
But in recent years, UN human rights experts and UNODC have denounced the use of the capital 
punishment for drug offenses as a violation of international human rights norms.166 
 
Some countries have applied the death penalty very publicly to foreign nationals in an attempt to 
discourage international trafficking, as in Indonesia’s execution of Australian, Nigerian, and 
Brazilian nationals for drug offenses in July 2015.167 But there is no evidence that drug-related 
executions have a deterrent effect on drug trafficking or other offenses.163 In Iran, where in 2011 
over 70% of state-sponsored executions were for drug offenses, the then head of the Iranian High 
Council for Human Rights observed that the executions did not seem to make a dent in the level 
of trafficking in the country.168 
[close box]  
 
Racial discrimination in drug-related mass incarceration 
The US has the highest rate of incarceration in the world at about 707 persons per 100 000 
population, about 50% higher than in the Russian Federation and more than five times higher 
than in China.169 As Table 1 shows, drug-related offenses account for a significant percentage of 
this incarceration. Aggressive prosecution of drug offenses along with mandatory minimum 
sentences for certain infractions helped to make drug-related mass incarceration a major engine 
for growth in US state and federal prison populations beginning in the 1980s (Figure 13).170  
 
[FIGURE 13 HERE] 
From Snyder and Mulako-Wangota, 2014.170 
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The racially disparate application of drug-related incarceration in the US is a prominent feature 
of mass incarceration. Persons of color, particularly African Americans, have been 
disproportionately affected by drug-related mass incarceration. In 2011, amongst men aged 30-
34, 1 in 13 African Americans were in prison, 1 in 36 Hispanic Americans, and 1 in 90 whites, 
though prevalence of drug use in these populations was similar.171 The Sentencing Project, an 
NGO focused on criminal justice, calculated in 2014 that African American men had a 32% 
probability of being in prison or other state custody at some time in their lives, compared to 17% 
for Hispanic men and 6% for whites.172 Figure 14 shows the racial disparity in drug-related 
incarceration at the federal and state level in 2013.173 
  
[FIGURE 14 HERE] 
From Carson (Bureau of Justice Statistics), 2014173  
 
This pattern reflects documented racial disparities at all stages of US law enforcement, from 
“stop and search” and arrest to sentencing and incarceration.  Beginning in the late 1990s, New 
York City undertook to clamp down on cannabis infractions, resulting eventually in nearly a half 
million arrests through 2013 – of young people for the most part – for minor cannabis 
infractions.174 There was consistent evidence that marijuana use was higher among whites than 
among African Americans or Hispanic Americans. In the decade beginning in 2004, African 
Americans comprised 25% of the population of the City but accounted for 54% of cannabis 
arrests; Hispanics made up 27% of the population but accounted for 33% of arrests.174 Arrests for 
drug-related infractions amongst teenagers across the US from 1980 to 2012, the large majority 
for cannabis, show a similar racial disparity (Figure 15).177 
 
The striking racial disparity in arrest and incarceration in the US parallels racially disparate 
patterns of HIV, and some investigators conclude that the two phenomena are closely related. 
Though African Americans comprise 14% of the US population, about 40% of new HIV cases 
and about half of AIDS cases in the US occur in this population.176 A number of studies show 
that a history of incarceration is associated with HIV incidence and prevalence among African 
American men and women.176-178  
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[FIGURE 15 HERE] 
From Snyder, 2012.175 
 
Racial and ethnic minorities are over-represented in prison and in arrest figures in countries other 
than the US, including aboriginal people in Canada and Australia and people of African origin in 
Brazil, but the contribution of drug-related arrests and convictions to these patterns is not 
clear.179 In Canada, aboriginal persons accounted for 3% of the adult population but 20% of 
adults sentenced to prison in 2013-14.180 Afro-Brazilians reportedly receive longer sentences for 
all categories of crime than Brazilians of non-African origin, and they are disproportionately 
targeted in drug policing and crackdowns.181 
 
In October 2015, the US government announced that it would release 6,000 federal prisoners 
incarcerated for minor drug offenses, meant to be the first tranche in a release of a possible 46 
000 federal prisoners of the 100 000 convicted of federal drug offenses.182 This unprecedented 
release is occasioned by a decision by the executive branch to reduce federal mandatory 
minimum sentences for minor drug offenses and make the reduction retroactive.182 The great 
majority of people serving prison sentences for drug offenses are in state – not federal – prisons, 
which are not affected by this change.173  
  
Drug-related incarceration of women 
Table 1 illustrates a striking gender disparity in drug-related imprisonment. While in any given 
drug market there are likely to be many more men than women involved in use, possession, and 
sale of drugs, a higher percentage of women than men are imprisoned because of drug-related 
convictions in virtually all countries where data exist on this point.158 The unanimously endorsed 
UN Bangkok Rules urge governments to find alternatives to incarceration for women convicted 
of non-violent offenses – the vast majority of incarcerated women – and to ensure protections 
from violence and other human rights abuses for those who are in state custody.183  But these 
rules seem to be commonly honoured in the breach. 
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Giacomello asserts that a large proportion of women convicted for small-scale sale and other 
non-violent offenses in Latin America are uneducated women living in poverty who had limited 
opportunities to earn licit income.159 A report by the OAS and the Inter-American Commission 
(IAC) on women echoes this view, estimating that most women imprisoned for drug-related 
offenses in the Americas are engaged in ‘micro-trafficking’ though they may be sentenced for 
long periods under harsh anti-trafficking statutes.160 The OAS-IAC report also notes that in many 
countries in the Americas, many women are convicted for bringing drugs into a prison or pretrial 
detention facility for a spouse or family member and that women’s low level in the drug market 
power chain means they have little leverage in plea bargaining or sentence reduction.160 In 
Mexico, CIDE researchers found that virtually all of the women imprisoned for drug-related 
crimes in 2012 were first-time offenders, and 92% were convicted of non-violent offenses.48 Of 
women accused of drug infractions in Argentina in 2013, almost 30% had been detained without 
trial for one to two years and about 12% for more than two years.160  
 
Overall in Europe and Central Asia, about one quarter of women in state custody are convicted 
drug offenders.184 In the US, there was a doubling of drug-related arrests of women, mostly for 
drug possession, from about 400 per 100 000 population in 1990 to a peak of about 800 per 100 
000 in 2006, after which the rate declined somewhat.175  
 
Women who use drugs in prison are also at risk of HIV from sexual violence or unprotected 
coercive sex as well as from drug use.185 As much as HIV services, including access to condoms, 
and drug dependence services are inadequate in men’s prisons, they are even more so in 
women’s prisons.185 While incarceration of women has increased in many countries in the last 20 
years, women are still a small percentage of the prison population in most countries, and 
developing specialised HIV, HCV or TB programmes for them is rarely a political, public health, 
or budgetary priority.185 
  
Detention of children and young people and the effect on children of parents’ incarceration are 
too little studied (web appendix III).  Pretrial detention of children and adults for drug offenses 
also poses health risks (web appendix IV).  
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Impact on families and communities 
The over-reliance on incarceration as a response to drug use may have a profound effect on the 
well-being of relatives and partners of people imprisoned for drug offenses.  Many studies 
document that incarceration of a family member imposes unique forms of financial strain, 
psychological distress, and logistical hardship on the family and is associated with deleterious 
health outcomes. 186-196  
 
Caring for a family member who uses drugs has its own challenges,197 but incarceration may 
generate further difficulties by increasing geographical distance between PWUD and their 
families, erecting barriers to communication, and subjecting family members to correctional 
surveillance and regulations when they maintain contact with their incarcerated loved one.198-200 
Parole and probation conditions may sometimes be incompatible with resources family members 
have to offer (e.g., housing outside of a district of parole, or in government-subsidised 
housing).201 In the US the impact of all of these factors falls disproportionately on people of 
color. (See web appendix  V.) 
 
A 2014 survey of people visiting family members in Mexican prisons indicated similar kinds of 
challenges in that setting. Of those visiting relatives, mostly women, over 50% said that because 
of the imprisonment of a spouse or family member they had had to get a job or an additional job; 
41% on the other hand said they lost a job; over 18% said they had to move house; and almost 
40% said the imprisonment impeded their ability to care for their children or grandchildren.48 
Spouses of incarcerated persons in this study also reported suffering disproportionately from a 
range of health problems, including high blood pressure and depression.48  
 
Infectious disease and drug-related incarceration 
Prisons and pretrial detention facilities worldwide are high-risk environments for infectious 
disease transmission. UN agencies estimate that prevalence of HIV, other sexually transmitted 
diseases, hepatitis C and hepatitis B infection, and TB is from 2 to 10 times higher in prisons 
than in the community.57 Coinfections among these infectious diseases are also likely in prison. 
In Argentina, for example, people living with TB who had a history of incarceration were 6 times 
more likely to be HIV-positive and 18 times more likely to have HCV infection than the general 
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population.76 Since most people in prison and pretrial detention return to the community, what 
happens behind prison walls in addressing infectious disease has ramifications for the whole 
population. 
 
As UNAIDS notes, excessive criminalization of drug-related offenses is one factor that 
contributes both to prison overcrowding and to the over-representation in prisons of people who 
are likely to have been exposed to HIV and, in the case of PWID, HCV and TB.57 PWUD are 
likely to be over-represented in prison particularly in countries where laws allow for lengthy 
custodial sentences for minor drug use, possession, and sale, and many may be imprisoned 
repeatedly.202 These factors figure in the 2014 recommendation of WHO to decriminalise drug 
use – and thus reduce incarceration of PWUD – as a critical step to enabling optimal HIV 
prevention, treatment, and care.152 
 
Drug injection does take place in prison, even where very restrictive measures are in place. Over 
90% of men surveyed in a 2015 study in Indonesia said they shared injection equipment while 
injecting drugs in prison, and 78% said they shared equipment with ten or more other 
prisoners.203 UNODC in 2015 summarized reports from 43 UN member states that had estimated 
or surveyed lifetime, annual, and past-month drug use while in prison among people in custody 
(Figure 16).7  A study of drug use in prison in the European Union, found that reported rates of 
ever having injected drugs in prisons among the countries providing data were in the range of 15-
30%.204 While some PWUD before serving a prison sentence will discontinue or reduce their use 
in prison or change their method of use, some people will seek to maintain drug use, including 
drug injection, or will begin using drugs while in prison.205  In addition to drug-related risk, 
PWUD in prison face HIV risks associated with unprotected sex, sexual violence, and unsafe 
tattooing.  As noted above, risk of sexual transmission of HIV may persist after prison if 
incarceration destabilises existing sexual relationships.176 
 
[FIGURE 16 HERE] 
From UNODC, World Drug Report, 2015.7 
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Numerous studies have documented HIV and HCV transmission in prison linked to drug 
injection, and others have demonstrated high prevalence of HIV and HCV among formerly 
incarcerated persons compared to other populations.202 One study estimated that about 10% of 
adults in the penitentiary system of the Russian Federation inject drugs with two thirds of those 
sharing syringes.202 
 
HIV in prison: There is not a recent comprehensive accounting of HIV prevalence in prison 
worldwide. In its 2014 report on gaps in the global HIV response, UNAIDS noted results for 
selected countries: HIV prevalence among adult prisoners is 15 times higher than in the general 
adult population in Ukraine, 10 times higher in Argentina, and 2.4 times higher in both South 
Africa and the US.57 In 2007, 11 sub-Saharan African countries reported HIV prevalence in 
prisons at least twice that in the general population.206 Data on HIV transmission in prison are 
rarer. An evaluation of attributable risks among PWID in a long-term study in Vancouver 
concluded that 21% of the HIV infections in this population were likely acquired in prison.207   
 
Prevalence and transmission of HCV in prison: People living with HCV infection are also 
over-represented in prison in many countries. Based on data from 39 countries, a 2013 review 
found an average prevalence of 26% positivity to HCV antibody among people in prison and 
about 65% among prisoners with a history of drug injection.208 Overall prevalence among 
women in this analysis was 32% compared to 24% for men.208A number of the reviewed studies 
presented evidence of HCV transmission in prisons. HCV prevalence in prisons may be high 
even where harm reduction services are available in the community. In Australia, for example, 
the prevalence of HCV infection among people entering prison in 2010 was 22% and among 
those with a history of drug injection 51%.209 Phylogenetic and spatial analysis in Australia 
located a number of clusters of in-prison HCV transmission and suggested high transmission risk 
when people move from between prisons or from prison to the community.210    
 
The Commission sought to investigate through mathematical modelling the contribution of 
incarceration to HCV transmission among PWID in several countries. Given the high 
incarceration rate amongst PWID211-214 and association between HCV infection or high risk 
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behavior and a history of incarceration,213, 215-224 it is unsurprising that incarceration could play 
an important role in driving HCV transmission among PWID.  
 
According to our results, interventions that aim to reduce transmission risk in prison (such as 
OST and possibly HCV treatment)225,226 or post-release could substantially reduce HCV 
incidence among PWID. Figures 17 and 18 illustrate this point, using modelling undertaken by 
Commissioner Peter Vickerman and colleagues Jack Stone and Natasha Martin to consider the 
role of incarceration on HCV transmission among PWID in four illustrative scenarios (similar to 
Scotland, Australia, Ukraine and Thailand), chosen to mimic important PWID incarceration 
characteristics of varied global settings. Using a model calibrated to a Scotland-like scenario, 
where moderate levels of incarceration (61% of PWID ever incarcerated, 12.7% in the last 6 
months), and short sentence lengths for PWID (average 7 months)71,220,227 means that PWID 
spend 16% of their injecting career being incarcerated (1.1 years). Despite lower HCV incidence 
amongst incarcerated PWID than amongst PWID in the community in Scotland227 (likely due to 
high levels of prison OST-- 57% -- among incarcerated PWID),71,227 modelling suggests 
incarceration still has a negative impact on the overall HCV epidemic due to the elevated risk of 
HCV acquisition among recently released PWID (threefold greater in first 6 months following 
release).220 Indeed, prison contributes only 5% of incident infections, whereas 24% of all 
incident infections occur in the period of elevated risk post-release. Because of the heightened 
HCV incidence post release, the HCV incidence amongst PWID in our Scotland-like scenario 
could be 47% lower if this risk was not present with OST maintained (Figure 18), but only 20% 
lower if incarceration had no effect on HCV transmission during or after prison.   
 
[Figures 17 and 18 here] 
 
Although Australia has similar incarceration rates and durations to those of Scotland, a lower 
level of prison OST (19% PWID receiving OST in prison)228 correlates with higher HCV 
incidence among incarcerated PWID,70,229 such that 22% of incident infections may occur in 
prison. In a setting such as Australia, modelling indicates HCV incidence amongst PWID could 
possibly be 49% lower if incarceration had no effect on HCV transmission and 66% lower with 
high coverage of prison OST and no elevated risk following release (Figure 18). By comparison, 
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in a setting with similar incarceration dynamics to those of Ukraine, where PWID receive longer 
sentences on average (14 months) compared to Scotland or Australia and inject for much longer 
(25 years on average compared to 7 years in Scotland), the lower proportion of PWID recently or 
ever incarcerated (52% of PWID ever incarcerated, 9.7% in last 6 months) results in a similar 
proportion of their injecting career in prison (18% of injecting career or 4.4 years) as in Scotland 
and Australia. Here, possibly due to longer durations of injecting, the overall contribution of 
prison to the epidemic amongst PWID could be far less than the other two settings if the pattern 
of transmission risk in and out of prison were similar; the model projects that HCV incidence 
amongst PWID could only be 14% lower if incarceration had no effect on HCV transmission and 
26% lower if there was higher coverage of prison OST and no elevated risk following release. 
 
By contrast, in a setting with similar incarceration patterns to those of Thailand, the combination 
of high incarceration rates (80% of PWID ever incarcerated, 17% in the last 3 months) and long 
prison sentences for PWID (12 months on average)230,231 means PWID are likely to be 
incarcerated for a substantial proportion of their injecting career (estimated at 46%), and to 
experience numerous periods of elevated HCV transmission post-release. For this Thailand-like 
scenario, the model estimates 53% of incident infections could occur in prison; HCV incidence 
could be 60% lower if incarceration had no effect on HCV transmission, and 94% lower with 
high coverage of prison OST and no increased risk following release (Figure 18). This analysis, 
although illustrative, highlights that incarceration could contribute substantially to HCV 
transmission among PWID and supports a growing body of evidence that interventions to reduce 
HCV risk among PWID in prison and post-release (such as OST and possibly HCV treatment)226 
could result in substantial benefits to the community and reduction in HCV transmission. 
 
TB and MDR-TB in prison: TB in prison and other closed settings has long been a public 
health concern, but TB risks increase in the presence of drug injection in closed settings. 
Overcrowding, poor sanitation, inadequate ventilation, the relatively high prevalence of HIV, 
and the insufficiency of basic services all contribute to TB transmission in prison.232 The 
significant representation in prisons in many countries of people with HIV, PWUD, people living 
in poverty, and formerly incarcerated people means that many people in custodial settings have 
been exposed to TB before they are incarcerated.144 Biadglegne and colleagues in 2015 indicated 
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sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe and Central Asia as the regions of greatest concern for 
TB transmission in prison, though data from Africa are sparse.232 Central Asia has the highest 
estimated prevalence of TB and MDR-TB of any region.147 A widely cited study by Stückler and 
colleagues estimated that in Eastern Europe and Central Asia from 1991 to 2002, increases in the 
rate of incarceration accounted for about 60% of the increase in TB in the general population.233 
In the WHO-Europe region, which includes Eastern Europe, it was estimated in 2010 that the 
relative risk for TB in prison was 145 times higher than in the community.234 WHO cites the 
estimate that worldwide about 1 in 11 cases of TB transmission in high-income countries occurs 
in prison, and about 1 in 16 in low- and middle-income countries.144 
 
Containing MDR-TB is crucial to national TB responses. Both MDR-TB and XDR-TB – 
extensively drug-resistant TB – have been reported in prisons at high levels in some cases.146 A 
2015 review of MDR-TB in prison found, for example, about 19% of all TB patients in Thai 
prisons were classified as MDR-TB, 13-55% in the Russian Federation, 52% in Azerbaijan, and 
almost 10% in Zambia.232 One study in the Russian Federation found XDR-TB cases to be 11% 
of TB patients tested in the prison.232  
 
Infectious disease in prisons is a heavy burden in EECA. Central Asia is estimated to have the 
highest rate of HCV prevalence among prisoners of any region.235 Ukraine, with the next-highest 
prison population in Eastern Europe after the Russian Federation, reported an HIV prevalence 
among prisoners of 14.5% in 2008 and 13.6% in 2011,235 as against HIV prevalence in the 
general population in that period of 1.2%.236 The Russian Federation has prison population of 
about 800 000 annually – the second highest in the world after the US – of which about 20% is 
estimated to have been convicted of drug offenses.237 It has not participated in reporting on HIV 
in prisons in the Dublin Declaration process, but it has experienced HIV outbreaks in prison in 
recent years.202 In 2002 it was estimated that the 36 000 HIV-positive persons in Russian prisons 
at the time accounted for about 20% of all HIV cases in the fast-growing epidemic in the 
country.205 
 
 
Prison services related to HIV, HCV and TB and drug dependence 
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It is an international norm that people in prison and other custodial settings have a right to health 
services at the level of those offered in the community in their jurisdictions.238 When it comes to 
HIV, HCV, and TB services, that norm is far from being respected. UNODC and WHO 
recommend a comprehensive package of measures for HIV prevention, care, and support for 
incarcerated persons, including NSP and OST (web appendix VI).239 These measures are also 
important for HCV prevention and care. Making these measures a reality, however, is proving 
challenging.   
 
Access to HIV and HCV prevention and care in prison 
OST has been shown in many countries to be very effective in custodial settings where people 
can be directly observed in taking medicine and can be followed if they have problems with 
dosage.205 But, according to a 2014 estimate by Harm Reduction International, of the 80 
countries where OST is available in the community, only 43 provide the services in at least one 
prison.76 In all of East and Southeast Asia, only Malaysia and Indonesia provide OST in prison.76 
Even in the European Union, which has high OST coverage in the community, OST in prison 
lags behind OST in the general population (Figure 19), though it is offered in prison in the 
majority of EU countries.240 Eight countries in Western, Central and Eastern Europe allow a 
people in prison to benefit from OST only if they were already OST patients before 
incarceration.235 In Central Asia where the need for HIV and HCV prevention services is so 
great, only Kyrgyzstan has OST and NSP in prison.76 OST is generally absent from US prisons 
but is available in most Canadian prisons.76 Resistance to OST in prisons is motivated partly by 
the belief, also found outside corrections systems, that any drug treatment in prison should be 
abstinence-based. As was noted by authorities in Scotland in the 1990s, however, it is as 
unrealistic to aspire to a drug-free prison as it is to aspire to a drug-free society.205 
 
[FIGURE 19 HERE] 
From EMCDDA, Prisons and drugs in Europe, 2012.240 
 
As noted by Kopak, the failure to provide effective treatment and care to people with problem 
drug use in the enormous US prison population perpetuates crime when people are released and 
returned to their previous circumstances.241 In the European Union, EMCDDA judged that in 
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2013 the availability of drug treatment programmes tailored especially to people in prison was 
“extensive.”75 Most EU countries report a variety of treatment options for drug dependence in 
prison, including “low-intensity” counseling, therapeutic community-type interventions, 
detoxification using various methods, abstinence-based Narcotics Anonymous, and group 
sessions, in addition to OST.240  
 
Provision of sterile injection equipment in prison is even rarer than OST, having been established 
and sustained in prisons in only eight countries, mostly in Western Europe.240 Several countries 
in Eastern Europe had prison NSP but were unable to sustain the programmes, which are always 
politically challenging.76 In a few countries, prison staff have resisted these programmes, and 
advocates for the programmes have faced the argument that providing injecting equipment 
encourages drug use. But in the case of Germany, when closure of NSP in prisons was proposed, 
prison workers protested, knowing that the programme protected them from injuries with 
contaminated needles as well as protecting the prison population.205 
 
HCV diagnosis and treatment services are limited in prisons in many countries. Diagnosing HCV 
is not a good investment if treatment cannot be provided, and the cost of HCV medicines as well 
as the need to ensure treatment over a long period are likely to have impeded treatment as a 
priority in prisons, especially in Western Europe where some drug sentences are relatively 
short.240 In the US from 2000 to 2012, only 12 of 50 state prison systems did any systematic 
HCV antibody testing.241 The much shorter duration of DAA therapies may make them more 
attractive in prisons, and a recent UK-based cost-effectiveness analysis indicates that HCV 
testing and treatment with short-course DAA therapy is cost-effective.226 One middle-income 
country that has made a breakthrough is Georgia, which struck a deal with Gilead Sciences for 
concessionary pricing on its DAA sofosbuvir and decided to include free treatment for people in 
prison who need it.244  
 
HIV and HCV services other than these harm reduction measures are equally important and 
frequently lacking in prisons and pretrial detention settings. Availability of voluntary HIV testing 
at any time during incarceration is recommended by WHO and UNODC,239 and some 
jurisdictions routinely offer HIV tests to people entering prisons.76 Nonetheless, UNAIDS reports 
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have consistently concluded that people in prison have poor access to HIV testing and 
treatment.57 While research from North America has shown that optimal outcomes from ART 
can be achieved in prisons,245 a large body of work from a range of settings shows that among 
PWID, incarceration is often strongly associated with poor access and adherence to ART, 
premature discontinuation of ART, and low rates of viral suppression.246-249 It appears that 
problems ensuring access to ART and related care within North America occurs throughout the 
incarceration process (e.g., in detention, during transfers, at discharge), and low access and 
adherence is shaped by high rates of HIV-related stigma and concerns about breaches of privacy 
within prison systems.246,250 (see web appendix VII).  
 
WHO’s 2007 global review of prison HIV services found virtually no ART in prison in countries 
with significant populations of PWID outside the Global North.251 Reviews in 2010 and 2014 of 
ART availability in prisons in the five countries outside the US with the largest number of PWID 
– the Russian Federation, China, Malaysia, Vietnam and Ukraine – indicated very limited ART 
overall for PWID in the community and virtually none at scale in prisons.56,83 Indonesia, a 
country with significant representation of PWID in prison, has provided ART to prisoners 
incarcerated for drug offenses. A 2015 study of randomly sampled prisoners found that HIV-
positive prisoners with a history of drug use were more likely to be receiving ART partly 
because they had been incarcerated for longer periods than other prisoners.252 Work from a range 
of settings, including Zambia,253 Namibia,254 India,255 Argentina,256 Brazil,257 and Thailand,258 
reveals low rates of engagement in HIV care, which often reflect structural and social barriers, 
including suboptimal health systems, privacy concerns, and violence. Whether for PWUD or 
others, WHO has recommended that ART in prison be given in a way that ensures confidentiality 
of the prisoner’s HIV status and that treatment efforts take care to ensure continuity of treatment 
for prisoners who are transferred or released.152   
 
Access to TB prevention and care in prison 
Prisons are an extremely high-risk environment for tuberculosis, but prison TB services remain 
inadequate in many countries, making TB a risk of incarceration. The significant representation 
in prisons in many countries of people with HIV, people who use drugs, people living in poverty, 
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and formerly incarcerated people means that many people in custodial settings have been 
exposed to TB before they even face the TB risks of prisons.144  
 
WHO and UNODC recommend a range of measures to control TB in prison, including: 
 “active case finding” including systematic offer of TB tests to all people in custody as well as 
monitoring of respiratory symptoms;  
 case reporting to a central health authority; 
 isoniazid preventive therapy for people living with HIV in prison, even in the absence of a 
positive TB test; 
 treatment of TB and reliable linking to care in the community if the course of treatment is of 
longer duration than the custodial sentence; 
 improvements in ventilation and sanitation; 
 provision of TB information to people in custody; and 
 offer of HIV testing for people testing positive for TB.239,259 
 
TB testing does not take place systematically in many prisons.144 Among the many barriers to TB 
services is the fact that prison health services are often not managed by health ministries, which 
may compromise the quality and coverage of care in prisons and may impede ensuring continuity 
of care between prison and the community.234 Loss to follow-up of people receiving TB 
treatment in prison is also a major challenge. An estimated 60-70% of prisoners testing positive 
for TB in Eastern Europe are not referred to any care in the community upon release.260 Dara and 
colleagues also note that prisons in many countries have not invested in laboratory capacity to 
use the GeneXpert assay that WHO recommends for diagnosis but rather rely on less accurate 
tools.260  Collaboration between TB and HIV authorities and integration of interventions in the 
two areas is crucial for TB control in prisons but lacking in many places.259  
 
Capacity to address HIV, HCV and TB in prisons, using the best medicines and diagnostic tools 
available in the community, is obviously dependent on financial resources.  The Global Fund has 
been an important source of funding for HIV and TB interventions in prison, enabling previously 
unavailable services to be expanded in prisons, especially in EECA and sub-Saharan Africa.261 
But many EECA countries have already become or soon will be ineligible for Global Fund 
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support,108 and it remains to be seen whether governments or other donors will fund these 
services.  
 
Even where services are available to people in state custody, delivering them in a patient-centred 
way is a particular challenge given the coercive nature of incarceration. Another central 
challenge is ensuring continuity of care upon release. Previously unpublished work in northern 
California by Commissioner Megan Comfort and colleagues illustrates that a lack of discharge 
planning and coordination of services virtually ensures the disruption of care. Among the 60 
persons living with HIV in an in-depth qualitative study, many described being released from 
county jail around midnight. Although it was standard practice to provide a 30-day supply of 
medications at release, if people were discharged when the jail pharmacy was closed, they left 
with no medications at all. Furthermore, participants characterised leaving jail in the middle of 
the night as generally destabilising for them, especially when public transportation was not 
running. The feeling of being sent back out onto the streets without even the most basic means of 
“reentering” the community encouraged people to immediately seek comfort in familiar 
activities, such as drug use, rather than wait for daylight to take the uncomfortable steps of 
seeking services on their own.  
 
The importance of continuity of care is illustrated quantitatively using data from the US and 
Canada reported by Iroh and colleagues (Figure 20).262 These authors conclude that testing and 
treatment can be achieved for people in prison, even at higher rates than in the general 
population, but that without attention to links to care after release, treatment interruptions are 
likely and may have serious health consequences.262 A PAHO report on HIV services in the 
Caribbean also concludes that for the large prison populations in that region, ensuring HIV 
services in prison is less challenging than making reliable links to care in the community for 
those leaving prison.263 
  
[FIGURE 20 HERE] 
From Iroh et al., 2015.262 
 
Drug policy and death from overdose 
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Drug overdose should be an urgent priority in drug policy and harm reduction efforts. Overdose 
can be immediately lethal and can also leave people with debilitating morbidity and injury, 
including from cerebral hypoxia. A 2013 systematic global review concluded that overdose was 
a leading cause of mortality of PWID in all regions.264 In 2014, WHO estimated that about 69 
000 people worldwide died annually from opioid overdose,265 but that estimate may not have 
captured the dramatic increase in opioid overdose deaths especially in North America  since 
2010. In the European Union, drug overdose accounts for 3.4% of deaths among people aged 15 
to 39 years.75  
 
Data on overdose are not systematically reported in many countries, but survey data in a number 
of countries indicate that nonfatal overdoses are not rare events among PWID. For example, 75% 
of a sample of about 600 PWID in Saint Petersburg, Russian Federation, indicated that they had 
experienced at least one overdose.128 Amongst about 900 men who injected drugs in Vietnam 
who were followed for two years, overdose was the second-highest cause of death after AIDS.266 
In Bangkok, amongst over 2400 HIV-negative people who injected drugs who were followed for 
an average of four years, overdose was the leading cause of death, far above traffic accidents.267 
 
In 2014, WHO issued its first guidance on community management of opioid overdose, 
underscoring evidence accumulated over four decades of the effectiveness of naloxone in 
averting death from opioid overdose.265 Naloxone (n-allylnoroxymorphone) is an opioid 
antagonist that can reverse the clinical manifestations of overdose essentially by displacing other 
opioids from the brain’s opioid receptors.265  Naloxone can be administered without highly 
specialized training, and it has no record of being diverted to non-medical use. Naloxone 
administration by police or emergency medical teams as well as by organizations providing 
services to people who use drugs has been documented to avert many thousands of deaths.265 
 
The literature suggests there are a number of ways in which pursuit of drug prohibition can 
exacerbate overdose and the risk of death from overdose. These include: 
 barriers to access to OST and other treatment for opioid dependence;  
 lack of control over strength, toxicity, and adulterants of street drugs; 
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 policing that increases overdose risk; 
 overdose vulnerability linked to incarceration and/or abstinence-based detoxification; 
 bans on supervised injection sites; 
 lack of use of anti-tampering packaging and other measures for controlled medicines; 
 barriers to access to availability and use of naloxone. 
 
Treatment for opioid addiction and overdose:  Overdose risk has been linked to lack of access to 
treatment for dependence on opioids, including for people using prescription opioids.265 Van 
Amsterdam and van den Brink conclude that the lower use of prescription opioids in the 
Netherlands – and thus the lower risk of overdose associated with that use – is because over 75% 
of those who need it have easy access to OST, compared to about 30% in the US.268  It is 
undoubtedly also the case that over-prescription of opioids in the US figures in the bleak 
overdose picture, a problem that must be addressed without curtailing access to opioid medicines 
for legitimate use.21 The long history in France of OST dominated by buprenorphine and more 
recent experience in New York suggest that buprenorphine may be particularly useful for 
overdose prevention in some populations.269,270 A well documented experience in Glasgow in the 
early 1990s suggested that treatment for opioid dependence dominated by buprenorphine kept 
overdose rates low.271 
 
Vulnerability to overdose is very high when people are released from abstinence-based 
detoxification and residential programmes or if they are abruptly dropped from medication-
assisted maintenance therapies.265 In this regard, the practice of institutions such as some drug 
treatment courts to force people to abandon OST after an arbitrary period without reference to 
medical need may contribute to overdose risk.272  
 
Adulterants and toxicity of street drugs: In recent years, heroin sold on the street in North 
America and Europe has been found to contain anthrax, fentanyl, and benzodiazepenes in 
addition to more benign additives such as caffeine and sugar.273 Fentanyl marketed as heroin has 
also been associated with lethal overdoses in some countries.274 Part of the advantage of 
prescribed and medically administered heroin as treatment for opioid dependence in Switzerland, 
Germany, and several other countries, for example, is the health authority’s ability to control and 
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know the dosage and purity of the heroin prescribed. Countries that pursue the goal of drug 
prohibition may object to heroin-assisted therapy as feeding rather than eliminating an 
addiction.275  
 
Policing and overdose risk: Policing and police crackdowns can add to the risk of overdose. 
When police pressure leads to injecting hurriedly without testing the strength of drugs, overdose 
risk increases.140 Crackdowns that cause people to inject in remote locations far from emergency 
services may also increase overdose risk. In countries where drug use itself is criminalised, 
people experiencing overdose may not seek emergency help if it comes in the form of police 
with authority to arrest them. A study in New York City found a strong correlation between 
police activity and overdose deaths, which the authors suggested was due to the reluctance of 
people who injected drugs to seek help for fear of arrest.276 Lunze and colleagues similarly found 
in Saint Petersburg that rate of drug arrests as a proxy for intensity of policing was associated 
with experiencing non-fatal overdose amongst PWID.128 
 
Incarceration and overdose:  Multiple studies confirm that the period soon after release from 
prison is a time of very high overdose risk.265 Men in the first two weeks after their release from 
prison were 29 times more likely to die than men of the same age in the general population, and 
women in the first two weeks after release were 69 times more likely to die than their 
counterparts in the general population.277 Tackling this problem requires concerted effort to 
ensure that people are linked to services, including access to naloxone and OST, as soon as they 
are released.265 
 
Overdose and supervised injection sites:  The EU drug monitoring agency (EMCDDA) notes that 
supervised injection sites (SIS) in eight European countries have been important in reducing 
overdose deaths.278 SIS enable people to inject in the presence of health professionals who can 
provide assistance in the case of overdose. Between 2004 and 2010, for example, the SIS in 
Vancouver, Canada, witnessed 778 overdoses among people using the site, but there were no 
deaths.279 A 2011 study published in the Lancet found that overdose deaths declined by 35% in 
the area around Vancouver’s SIS within just two years.280  In addition to their health benefits, 
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there is no evidence from research on SIS that they are linked to initiation of new drug use, more 
frequent injection, or a rise in crime.278, 281-283  
 
Anti-tampering measures for prescription opioids:  Pharmaceutical technology has made possible 
a range of formulations and packaging of prescription medicines, especially opioids, that are 
designed to reduce the possibility of non-medical use of these medicines and overdose. These 
include formulations that are resistant to crushing, chewing, smoking, dissolving and 
injectability; extended-release formulations; addition of naloxone or other aversive ingredients to 
the formulation; and formulations that chemically isolate the active form of the opioid.284,285 In 
the US state of Florida, a policy change requiring the use of a tamper-resistant formulation of the 
widely used opioid oxycodone was associated with a significant decline in oxycodone 
overdose.286 Some other studies had more equivocal results, and some experts caution that 
tamper-resistant formulations may create a false sense of security and contribution to over-
presciption of opioids.287,288  
 
Factors impeding access to and use of naloxone: Advocates for improved health services for 
PWUD have long asserted that naloxone should be widely available, even without a prescription. 
But naloxone remains out of reach in many places because of tight legal and regulatory 
restrictions. Part of the challenge in some jurisdictions is that physicians fear legal liability in 
prescribing naloxone, just as people who may witness an overdose and be in a position to assist 
may fear legal liability in administering naloxone if something goes wrong.289 Bystanders who 
have used drugs may also be reluctant to contact the police or medical emergency personnel for 
fear of being arrested themselves.290  
 
In many countries, PWID fear health services but may frequent pharmacies for injection 
equipment and other supplies. For this reason, Hammett and colleagues investigated possibilities 
for naloxone provision in pharmacies in the Russian Federation, Viet Nam, China, Canada, 
Mexico, and the US. They found a variety of legal barriers and practices. Even where naloxone 
can be prescribed by any physician, it was unlikely to be stocked in pharmacies but rather 
supplied directly to emergency personnel under so-called standing orders.291 In the Russian 
Federation, where the need is great, naloxone could be supplied to and administered only in 
health facilities at the time of this study. Similarly, in China only health facilities could receive 
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and use naloxone.291 Media reports indicate that a programme of the province of Ontario, Canada 
to improve availability of naloxone, including the purchase of 1800 doses, was stopped in 2013 
because of unspecified regulatory problems.292 
 
Since the study by Hammett and others, there have been some positive changes in the US. As of 
July 2015, facing increasingly visible overdose problems, 31 of the 50 states plus the District of 
Columbia had passed ‘Good Samaritan’ laws to enable people to provide assistance in the case 
of overdose, including using naloxone, without legal liability for the outcomes.289 Some 40 states 
have made it easier for physicians to prescribe naloxone for use in responding to overdoses 
without legal repercussions. In addition, as of 2015, 14 US states have authorized over-the-
counter – that is, non-prescription – sale of naloxone in some pharmacies to some first 
responders or family members.293 In 2015 a bill was introduced in the US Congress that would 
enable federal support for greatly expanded access to naloxone.294 
 
 
Treatment for drug dependence: the need for standards 
 
Compulsory detention for ‘treatment’ 
A small minority of people who use drugs develop drug dependence. But in many parts of the 
world, many PWUD are assumed to have problematic use or to be criminals, and compelling 
them to undergo drug treatment is a widespread practice. 
 
In addition to the vast use of incarceration through criminal justice systems in the pursuit of drug 
prohibition, in some countries there is large-scale extrajudicial detention of drug offenders in the 
name of “treatment” or “rehabilitation”.  In China, Cambodia, Viet Nam, Lao PDR, Malaysia, 
Thailand, and Indonesia, compulsory “treatment” centres hold thousands of people who are 
detained generally without due process, for the most part without valid assessments of whether 
they are drug-dependent, without access to scientifically sound treatment of any kind, and 
offering ‘treatment’ that sometimes consists of forced labour and cruel and demeaning 
punishment.295,296 In March 2012, 12 UN bodies denounced these centres on public health and 
human rights grounds and called for their closure,297 but most continue to operate.  Human 
Rights Watch did ground-breaking from 2008 to 2013, documenting heinous human rights 
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abuses in these centres – including many forms of forced labour, torture, beating, humiliation 
and degradation, and denial of basic health care and adequate sanitation and food.295  (See web 
appendix VIII for a longer description.) 
 
Compulsory drug detention centres are extreme in the scale and nature of abuses committed in 
the name of treatment, but there are many other examples of abusive and scientifically unsound 
practices brought to bear to address drug dependence. In many countries, treatment of drug 
dependence is one of the most unregulated and unmonitored of all health services, left often to 
private actors not required to adhere to standards of quality and clinical soundness.298 There is no 
systematic monitoring of drug treatment practices by UN or regional multilateral bodies. Though 
there are general recommended standards and position papers from the UN,299 there are no 
agreed quality-control standards approved by UN member states. 
 
A few researchers have documented cruel and inhuman practices in private-sector drug 
“treatment” operations in countries in Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and North 
America.298 Some examples of abusive practices include the following: 
 Coercion to enter treatment, with or without the help of local police. In the Russian 
Federation, there are cases of family members colluding with treatment facilities effectively 
to abduct people and deliver them to treatment centres. In Guatemala, church-affiliated 
centres organize “hunting parties” sometimes made up of current patients, to take people who 
are inebriated into treatment without informed consent.300 O’Neill’s in-depth studies of 
centres in Guatemala document cases of people living in squalid conditions, being mocked, 
derided, beaten, tied up, and left to scream for help, sometimes not even understanding how 
they arrived at the facility.300  
 Some private treatment facilities lock people up and even chain them to beds or trees without 
offering them any means of challenging or appealing involuntary commitment. The danger of 
chaining of people to their beds in drug ‘rehabilitation’ facilities was graphically illustrated 
in Moscow in 2006 and twice in Lima, Peru in 2012 when fires struck the facilities, and 
patients were killed because they could not flee.301 Both HRW302 and the UN Special 
Rapporteur on torture303 documented horrific conditions in ‘prayer camps’ in Ghana in which 
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people were chained to beds and trees, held sometimes for over a year, and required to fast 
and to undergo exorcisms.  
 
In Nigeria, young people report abusive behavior by the police, in some cases when they are 
taken to facilities that are meant to offer health services. (See web appendix IX.) 
 
Access to drug dependence treatment and drug policy 
Lack of or curtailed availability of OST using methadone, buprenorphine or other opioids, 
discussed above, is a public health concern not only for reduction of injection and thus of HIV 
risk but also because of OST’s effectiveness and cost-effectiveness for treating opioid 
dependence.126 It is backed by more than 50 years of extensive practice and an enormous body of 
research including several meta-analyses and large reviews in many settings.304,305   
 
Decades of research on OST have helped to inform consensus on treatment standards and good 
practice.  In the European Union, for example, nearly all countries have OST minimum standard 
and quality-of-care guidelines, though they often do not have such guidance for treating non-
opioid dependence.306 National guidelines cover elements of care such as dosage levels, criteria 
for judging whether take-home doses can be given and for how long, use of urinalysis as part of 
treatment, certification of health professionals as OST specialists, the need to give priority in 
care to pregnant women, and in some countries elements of integrating OST in general practice 
and primary care facilities.  With regard to dosage, there are many controlled studies and 
research reviews indicating that higher doses of methadone in OST programmes are associated 
with better retention in and outcomes of treatment as well as lower likelihood of use of illicit 
drugs.307-311 Nonetheless, based on its monitoring of national policies and practices, WHO has 
found it necessary to remind national authorities that adequate doses in OST are essential 
practice in spite of drug control concerns and that lowering doses of methadone as a punishment 
for drug use or breaking programme rules is not acceptable, even in prison.126,312 Switzerland’s 
remarkable experience with one of the historically most rapid expansions of OST in history 
(discussed further below) exemplifies how reforming drug policy to be more centered on health 
outcomes and less centered on policing can facilitate the establishment of best practices in 
OST.313  
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In a number of European countries and Canada, OST is complemented by heroin-assisted 
therapy (HAT) usually for the limited number of people with long-time use for whom other 
medication-assisted therapies have not had the desired results.275 HAT programmes are well 
received in Germany and Switzerland, for example, where it is recognized that, like methadone 
therapy, they enable people to stabilise their cravings without having to rely on street drugs of 
unknown quality and toxicity from illicit dealers.314 The HAT trial in Montreal and Vancouver, 
Canada, in spite of excellent results, was discontinued by the Conservative-led government in 
2013 with the pronouncement that HAT was “in direct opposition to the government’s anti-drug 
policy.”315 A 2014 court decision, however, allowed patients already receiving HAT to continue 
doing so.316 
 
A substantial body of research, mostly from the Global North, includes several meta-analyses 
and large evaluations of drug dependence treatment investigating these factors.317 There are 
many methodological challenges in this work, including that measurement of the costs associated 
with drug-related crime and productivity losses is not always straightforward, accounting for 
relapse is tricky, and there are not good data on some of these elements in many countries.317 
Nonetheless a number of studies indicate that the costs of crime reduction alone more than offset 
the costs of treatment, in some cases several times over.318,319 Two studies from China calculated 
high returns from OST based largely on the economic benefit from averting HIV 
transmission.320,321  
 
Options for treatment of dependence on many types of psychoactive drugs are very limited and 
remain a challenge for addiction science. Research on new treatments for dependence on 
stimulants, including amphetamine-type stimulants and cocaine, has been called for by health 
professionals for some time, particularly medication-assisted treatments that would be the 
analogue of OST for opioids.322 Some studies suggest that drug dependence treatment is most 
effective when combined with support for stable housing, food assistance, employment 
assistance, and other social services.317 The poor track record of some forms of treatment without 
attention to these social services suggests that public funding priorities should include social 
services linked to treatment.323  
62 
 
 
There remain many gaps in access to and affordability of care for those who need it. The annual 
report of UNODC regularly documents drug seizures and drug crop production but only for the 
first time in 2015 reported information from UN member states on availability of treatment for 
drug dependence. The information from countries reflects only the existence of services and a 
rough estimate of the level of coverage (low, medium, high) and says nothing about quality.7 
Even so, as shown for psychosocial treatment methods in Figure 21, the data reveal wide 
regional disparity in availability of services. Cognitive-behavioral therapy, for example, is 
frequently recommended to treat dependence on stimulants for which there is not currently a 
consensus recommendation for medication-assisted therapies. But it is virtually unavailable in 
Africa and much less available in Asia and the Americas than in Europe. A 2013 estimate 
concluded that 80% of the people needing treatment for substance abuse live in lower-income 
and middle-income countries, but the proportion of those receiving care in those countries is 
more like 20%.324   
 
[FIGURE 21 HERE] 
From UNODC, World Drug Report, 2015.7  
 
Drug dependence can be impoverishing, and treatment of it can be expensive. Subsidized 
treatment slots may be scarce and waiting lists long, even in countries with well-developed 
health systems, as in Western Europe and Canada.315,325 In the US, realizing the promise of the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) to expand health insurance coverage for drug dependence-related 
services for millions unable to afford them before ACA has been hampered by lack of human 
resources to expand care and lack of integration of these services with other federally qualified 
health services.326  
 
Women and drug dependence treatment 
In many countries, women are particularly disadvantaged by the lack of access to good-quality, 
affordable treatment for drug dependence that is tailored to their situations and needs. Policy 
discussions about women’s access to treatment for drug dependence surface most readily in 
some places with respect to pregnant women and concerns about the well-being of newborns – 
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the “innocent victims”.  But it is women’s own concern about retaining custody of their children 
that may stand in the way of seeking treatment. In EECA, for example, women in some countries 
would be justified in fearing that just the act of seeking treatment would brand them as users in 
official drug registries, which could trigger loss of child custody in some circumstances.327 In 
other countries, even where there are not formal drug registries, drug use may figure prominently 
in child custody decisions by state authorities as women who use drugs are likely to be seen as 
unfit parents.328,329 A 2004 UNODC report noted that there were still some places where by law 
women who are found to use drugs could be incarcerated for their entire pregnancy and 
sometimes longer.330 Any such factors, including stigma on the part of health service providers, 
can inhibit women’s seeking of treatment services.  
 
Pregnant women who use drugs are often confronted with concerns about their newborns that are 
not scientifically sound. An example is the demonisation, assisted by mass media, of women 
who used crack in the United States in the 1980s and 1990s who were accused of producing a 
generation of mentally deficient ‘crack babies’.331 Long-term longitudinal studies demonstrated 
that exposure to crack during pregnancy did not significantly affect cognitive outcomes of 
children in later life and that other factors associated with poverty were probably more important 
determinants.332 Myths and exaggerations have also persisted about opioid dependence among 
neonates, including about infants born to women who are OST patients, in spite of research 
showing that neonatal abstinence syndrome related to opioids can be cured and does not have 
long-term effects on children.333 In protesting widespread media reports in 2013 about “opiate-
addicted babies” born to OST patients, 40 prominent physicians and scientists from Europe and 
the US  asserted that “demonizing pregnant women creates an environment where punishment 
rather than support is the predominant response, and will inevitably serve to discourage women 
from seeking care.334  
 
Health experts lament the lack of drug treatment services tailored to women’s needs.187,327 Drug 
treatment services are rarely integrated with reproductive health, pediatric and other services that 
women may seek.335 Child care may not be available in drug clinics, or children may simply not 
be allowed on the premises. A global review by a UN-convened group of experts in 2010 
concluded that treatment programmes for women rarely account for the differences between men 
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and women in the speed with which they may develop drug dependence, their responses to 
varied forms of treatment, and the psychological co-morbidities with which they present.335 
These experts concluded that women in drug treatment are more likely to be suffering from 
anxiety, depression, suicidal thoughts, and deep guilt than their male counterparts, and much 
more likely to be the main caregivers of dependent children.335  
 
Numerous countries have established special drug treatment courts, which are generally meant to 
offer court-supervised drug treatment to as an alternative to incarceration for some categories of 
drug offenses. Emerging evidence raises concerns about some of these models.  (See web 
appendix X.) Many drug courts as well as other treatment providers use drug testing, not always 
in rights-based ways. (See web appendix XI.)  
 
Drug control policy and access to controlled medicines 
The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 has the dual purpose of (1) ensuring that 
controlled substances, including opioids, are available for medical and scientific purposes and (2) 
preventing their misuse and diversion. However, after more than 50 years under this regime, 
some 75% of the world’s population or about 5.5 billion people do not have safe and adequate 
access to controlled medicines for the management of pain, including post-operative pain and the 
severe pain associated with cancer, burns, fractures, and other causes.336 For example, 92% of 
morphine use is in countries that account for 17% of the world’s population, mostly in the Global 
North.336 Inequity of access to controlled medicines for pain management and other clinical uses 
is now a public health and human rights crisis.   
 
WHO explicitly highlights the role of drug control policy as a barrier to access to licit controlled 
medicines: 
…[T]he drug control conventions that established the dual obligation of ensuring 
adequate availability of controlled medications and of preventing their misuse have 
existed for almost 50 years. Yet the obligation to prevent abuse of controlled substances 
has received far more attention than the obligation to ensure their adequate availability 
for medical and scientific purposes, and this has resulted in countries adopting laws and 
regulations that consistently and severely impede accessibility of controlled medicines.337 
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WHO notes that national drug legislation often “includes provisions stricter than the international 
drug control conventions require.”337 The health agency urges countries to “examine their drug 
control legislation and policies for the presence of overly restrictive provisions that affect 
delivery of appropriate medical care involving controlled medicines” and make needed 
reforms.387 WHO also enjoins countries to ensure that drug-related decisions that are “medical in 
nature should be taken by health professionals”.337  
 
There are numerous ways in which drug control policy and regulations exceed the measures 
recommended in the UN drug conventions and contribute to impeding access to and utilisation of 
controlled medicines337,338 (Table 2). 
  
Inappropriate regulatory language, emphasizing “abuse” or “misuse” to describe long-term use 
of controlled medicines, can affect attitudes and stigmatise these medicines and their use.337 
Certain national drug laws and regulations refer to controlled medicines as “poisons” or 
“dangerous drugs.”339 WHO warns against laws that suggest incorrectly that “a patient requiring 
increasing doses of an opioid for pain relief because of pharmacological tolerance due to 
prolonged treatment” is drug-dependent.337 Poor knowledge of addiction medicine in the medical 
community can lead to propagation of such misunderstandings. In India, for example, the law 
includes a definition of an “opioid addict” but does not include distinct definitions for a patient 
receiving prescribed opioid medicines of a drug-dependent person who is undergoing treatment, 
leading to stigmatising characterisations of these persons.340  
 
Striking a balance in national policy between maintaining adequate access to and availability of 
controlled medicines and retaining strong measures to prevent diversion or misuse is an 
important goal. Among the measures that countries should take to strike this balance, 
international bodies, including WHO337 and the Global Commission on Drug Policy,341 
recommend the following: 
 Establishing a national authority for controlled medicines that enables health-care and law 
enforcement interests to be represented equally in policy-making and procedures; 
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 Ensuring that laws and regulations recognize that controlled medicines are essential for a 
wide range of medical conditions and guarantee people’s right to have access to them; 
 Ensuring competence of health professionals on the latest science of use of controlled 
medicines; and 
 Monitoring to recognize and define points of high risk for misuse and diversion within the 
distribution system, and refining policies to address these specific points without 
undermining access to and availability of controlled medicines. 
 
Balanced policy on controlled medicines has been difficult to achieve in many countries in all 
regions of the world. India, for example, is a major producer and exporter of opium destined for 
medical and scientific use.342 Ironically, 97% of patients in pain in the country do not have 
access to opioid analgesics.343 The chief barrier was the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances (NDPS) Act of 1985, which required hospitals and pharmacies to procure and 
maintain five or six time-bound licenses from distinct state-level bureaucratic agencies.344 
Punitive consequences were very severe for even minor clerical errors. This led most institutions 
to refrain from stocking and dispensing opioids to avoid the legal complexities and punitive 
consequences.344 For decades health-care professionals went through their training programmes 
without gaining skills in using opioids as medications; opioids were not stocked or used even in 
medical schools. Opioid consumption fell by 97% in the first decade of enactment of the law.344  
 
But changes are under way in India. A civil society alliance, driven by the health and 
humanitarian need, helped to spearhead a 2014 amendment to the NDPS Act, which reoriented 
the law, incorporating simplified procedures for improving access and availability of opioid 
medications in the country.342 The reformed policy also incorporates processes supporting opioid 
substitution therapy as medication-assisted treatment for managing drug dependence, expanding 
possibilities beyond abstinence-based treatment.342 Such reforms along with country-wide efforts 
on training of health-care professionals on use of opioids based on the WHO guidelines, is 
expected to counteract historical demonization of opioids and opioid users in several countries. 
Nonetheless, practices cannot change overnight. Sustained advocacy and reorientation of training 
and research is called for.342 
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Assessing the public health risk and clinical value of controlled substances 
The challenge of ensuring adequate access to controlled medicines is related closely to the way 
in which international and national authorities assess the degree of danger or potential harm 
associated with specific substances. For the international regime, the Single Convention (article 
3) explicitly confers on WHO the responsibility to judge whether substances are dangerous and 
in need of strict control.6 The 1971 convention emphasizes in its article 2 that the CND should 
regard WHO’s assessments on drugs to be “determinative as to medical and scientific 
matters.”345  
 
Like many national laws, the international drug treaties establish a “scheduling” or ranking of 
substances by their degree of risk. Schedule IV substances in the 1961 Single Convention are 
judged to be the most risky, defined as substances deemed by the World Health Organization to 
be “particularly liable to abuse and to produce ill effects…not offset by substantial therapeutic 
advantages” (article 3(5)).6 Cannabis and cannabis resin, for example, are in Schedule IV. (The 
numbering of the schedule classifications in the 1961 convention is somewhat counter-intuitive. 
Schedule I also classifies substances as “liable to abuse” and without off-setting therapeutic 
value, but Schedule IV emphasizes for some Schedule I substances that they are “particularly” 
dangerous.  Schedule III includes substances judged to be less “liable to abuse”. The scheduling 
system of the 1971 drug convention on synthetic psychotropic substances is more 
straightforward, with Schedule I being the most restrictive and Schedule IV the least.)   
 
Widely cited articles in the Lancet in 2007 and 2010 report on exercises in which drug 
dependence specialists in the UK ranked drugs by their potential to cause physical harm to the 
user, their potential to induce dependence, and their harms to families and communities.346,347 
The authors compared the ranking of these experts with the scheduling of medicines in the drug 
conventions. For example, the experts deemed cannabis, LSD, and GHB to be less harmful than 
many substances though they are classified as “most dangerous” in the conventions. Alcohol, 
which was deemed more dangerous than many controlled substances, is obviously not scheduled 
in the conventions. A later assessment by addiction experts from across the European Union 
made a similar ranking.348 
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In the international drug conventions, WHO is mandated to oversee the application of the latest 
scientific evidence to the classification of the potential harms of psychoactive substances, but its 
conclusions are not always the last word on these issues. (See web appendix XII .) 
 
Research challenges in drug policy 
 
A large body of research has helped to advance many aspects of the drug policy debate. Opioid 
agonist therapy, for example, has benefited from decades of clinical research in numerous 
settings to the point where good practises are well documented and can be adopted and adapted 
readily. The benefits and cost-effectiveness of NSP and programmes to address opioid overdose 
are also supported by a strong research base that should inspire scaling up these programmes to 
reduce the needless morbidity and mortality suffered by millions because of the absence of these 
services. 
 
The same is not true of empirical research on larger drug policy decision-making, including 
social science research on alternatives to traditional prohibition-oriented policy. In view of the 
rapid pace of cannabis legalization in Uruguay and the US, it would arguably have been useful to 
have the chance to test measures such as restriction of various forms of advertising, pricing and 
taxation strategies, and ‘cannabis club’ approaches vs. general population-based legalization.27 
More social science research would also be useful to follow experiments in less harmful policing 
of drugs.137   
 
Hall notes that funding research that would draw lessons on drug market regulation from alcohol 
and tobacco regulation, for example, has not been a priority of major research funders, especially 
compared to more abundant funding for neurological and clinical harms of drug use.349 The 
effectiveness of treating drug dependence depends on correct diagnosis of dependence and other 
disorders, which remains a matter of controversy in many respects and a subject of considerable 
research. Academic debates abound on the physiological and psychological basis for assessing 
drug-use disorders. A central debate, highlighted in a 2015 exchange in Lancet Psychiatry, is 
around the “brain disease” model of drug dependence.349 Commissioner Carl Hart, who is a 
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member of the Advisory Council of the US National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), discusses 
this idea in an online appendix (section XIII).. 
 
With cannabis having been the centre of drug policy reform discussions in North and South 
America and Western Europe, medical uses of cannabis are of great interest to researchers. 
Cannabinoids have been approved for medical use in numerous jurisdictions and have been the 
object of enough research to warrant systematic reviews and meta-analysis.350,351 The 2015 
review by Whiting, et al, supports the use of some cannabinoids to address neuropathic pain and 
spasms.350 At this writing, the evidence is somewhat less plentiful on medical uses of the 
cannabis plant.  Both a 2015 review by Deshpande351 and an analysis by Madras undertaken for 
the WHO Expert Committee on Drug Dependence352 concluded that while there are many 
reports of benefits from medical cannabis users, there is a need for more controlled studies. The 
Expert Committee itself undertook to collect more evidence on medical use of cannabis and 
cannabis resin for a future comprehensive review.353  
 
There is also a need for research on the health impact of different patterns recreational use of 
cannabis – research that should be greatly facilitated by the availability of legal cannabis in more 
and more locations.354 At least in the US, however, there remain obstacles to expanding this 
research.355 Restrictions impede research both on the health effects of medical and recreational 
cannabis use and also on the important drug policy question of whether cannabis availability 
influences the use of other legal and illegal substances. At a time of enormous policy-level 
concern about dependence on prescription opioids, for example, there are a few ecological 
studies that suggest the possibility that greater access to cannabis might reduce use of opioids for 
pain relief.356,357 This is a question that richly merits controlled studies with human subjects.  
 
In 2002, the United Nations established a Reference Group on HIV and Injecting Drug Use that 
both advised the UN system on programmes and policies related to HIV amongst PWID and also 
was involved in generating independent research on HIV and drug use.358  Some of the work 
cited in this report came from this group,335 as well as other thematic works on 
methamphetamine use and HIV and prescription opioid use and HIV359,36\0 and global reports on 
patterns of HIV transmission and prevalence amongst PWID and HIV services for PWID.361-363 
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In our view, the Reference Group served an important research function, particularly in helping 
to keep independent, high-quality research on drug use and health in the public sphere. The 
Reference Group no longer meets as an independent body. We believe its job is not done, and it, 
or something like it, would be very valuable to reconstitute.  
 
In some countries, there is a dearth of data on fundamental elements such as the extent and 
nature of drug consumption. Nigeria is undertaking one of the continent’s first population-based 
surveys of drug use with support from the European Development Fund.364 The survey is meant, 
among other things, to serve as a baseline for measuring progress of the improved services for 
people who use drugs that are also planned. 
 
Respected scholars who have endeavoured to bring the best new research to drug policy 
decision-making have sometimes been attacked for their efforts.  For an example from 
Vancouver, Canada, see the web appendix XIV. 
 
Drug crops, drug policy and health 
 
People may become involved in drug markets for many reasons, but poverty and exclusion from 
mainstream economic opportunities are important factors in many cases. Nonetheless, it is rare 
that drug policies are evaluated by the way that they affect people living in poverty or human 
development more broadly.13 In this report, we highlight the situation of people whose livelihood 
depends on growing crops used to make psychoactive drugs as an example of neglected health 
and human security issues at the intersection between drug control and development (see web 
appendix XV). 
 
Drug crop production flourishes in spite of risks 
Enforcing prohibition-oriented drug policy means not only policing use, possession, and sale but 
also terminating the supply of these drugs at the sources.  Historically the obligations of 
obligations of international drug control have rested heavily on states in South America and 
Southeast and Southwest Asia to curb supply of coca leaf, opium poppy, and cannabis, rather 
than consumer countries of the North to reduce demand.365 The Single Convention of 1961 
prohibits the cultivation of coca leaf, opium poppy and cannabis for anything other than 
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scientific or medical purposes.6 The focus on eradicating these crops, including through the 
militarised means implied in the term ‘drug war’, persists despite the strong growth of synthetic 
drug manufacture and use, which now dominates drug supply and consumption.365  
 
In spite of aggressive prohibition, these crops nonetheless are widely grown.  Cultivator 
communities are typically located in regions or countries where basic state services are deficient 
and where there is an absence of health services and infrastructure. In 1998 UNODC estimated 
that some 4 million persons were in households deriving income from cultivation of coca leaf 
and opium poppy (without attempting an estimate for cannabis),8 and there is little reason to 
suppose that the figures today are smaller.  Decades of investment in initiatives to eradicate these 
crops have failed to make a sustained dent in global production. Figure 22 shows estimated 
production of opium poppy destined for non-medical use from the countries that account for the 
great majority of production.366 In Afghanistan, the principal producer, opium poppy production 
in 2012-2013 was two and a half times the level of 2000.367    
 
Motivations for relying on drug crops for household income may differ, but the decision to grow 
drug crops is generally highly rational. Opium and coca are non-perishable, robust crops, well 
suited to the poor agricultural conditions in which farmers in coca, poppy and cannabis-growing 
areas often find themselves.368,369 Extensive cannabis cultivation in the Rif region of northern 
Morocco, for example, provides the livelihood for hundreds of thousands of people where the 
mountainous and arid terrain would permit few other crops to thrive and transporting perishable 
goods would be difficult.370 Drug crops have high value for the amount of labor they require, and 
the market for these crops is, in spite of illegality, relatively reliable.368  
 
[FIGURE 22 HERE] 
From UNODC, Southeast Asia opium survey, 2014.366 
 
Another important factor that may influence the decision to grow drug crops is insecurity of land 
tenure or lack of access to land. Coca bush, for example, produces four to six crops per year after 
only six to eight months of growth of new bushes,371 whereas coffee and some fruits, for 
example, require a longer growth period before there is revenue.. Opium poppy yields returns 
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after a short growing period and requires few inputs. In Afghanistan, according to Mansfield and 
Pain, poppy growing has at times enabled poor farmers to arrange land tenancy or sharecropping 
that would be impossible without the effective credit-worthiness that comes with poppy-
growing.372     
 
In the Andes, rural households have persisted in coca production in spite of herculean efforts to 
cut them off from this source of livelihood. Forcible eradication of coca – through burning, use 
of chemical herbicides or manual deracination – has been part of drug supply reduction strategies 
for decades.50 It has been encouraged by massive infusions of US funds particularly to support 
aerial spraying of enormous areas of the Andes with herbicides. Under Plan Colombia (2000-
2012), an average of 128,000 hectares per year in Colombia alone were subjected to aerial 
spraying of glyphosate – a product also known under the Monsanto brand name of Round-Up.373 
Despite enormous investments in the aerial spraying program in Colombia, impact evaluations 
show that this is a very ineffective and costly strategy in reducing coca cultivation. Mejía and co-
authors show that in order to eliminate 1 hectare of coca crops, 30 hectares need to be sprayed, at 
a cost of about $80 000 per hectare eliminated (the market value of coca leaf in one hectare is 
about $400).369 
 
Coca production patterns since the 1990s illustrate the so-called ‘balloon effect’, as shown in 
Figure 23. That is, as eradication efforts intensified in one place, cultivation moved elsewhere. 
For example, under the US-supported program Plan Colombia, over US $1.2 billion per year in 
the period 2006-2011 – more than 1% of the GDP of Colombia – was spent on aggressive 
eradication of coca in Colombia.50 As coca production declined in Colombia after 2006, it 
increased in Peru and Bolivia as producers moved (and in some cases moved back) to those 
locations, and cocaine processing facilities also moved to neighboring countries.50 In its 2014 
survey of coca production, UNODC noted that in addition to simply moving, coca producers 
have found various means of combating aerial spraying, including interspersing and rotating 
their coca bushes with other crops to avoid detection, planting in remote areas less likely to be 
detected, washing the leaves, putting molasses or other substances on the leaves to counter the 
herbicide, and isolating the leafy part of the plant from the herbicide.366,374  
 
73 
 
[FIGURE 23 HERE] 
From UNODC and Plurinational State of Bolivia, 2015;375 UNODC and Government of Colombia;376 
UNODC and DEVIDA (National Drug Commission of Peru), 2015377 
 
Growing drug crops, then, may be  rural households’ strategy to confront many forms of 
marginalisation – lack of secure land tenure, lack of access to credit, poor transportation 
infrastructure, hostile agronomic conditions, and lack of other opportunities in the mainstream 
economy. The mentality of drug prohibition, however, is to dismiss this complexity of people’s 
decision-making and see drug crop producers simply as profit-motivated criminals. 
 
Health impact of crop eradication 
The health impacts of crop eradication have been relatively little studied. While the US provided 
high levels of assistance for the mobilization of the needed aircraft, contractors, and herbicide 
supplies, rigorous and independent evaluation of the health and social impact of aerial spraying 
were not a priority of Plan Colombia.  In 2005, the drug policy arm of OAS, known as CICAD 
(Comisión Ineramericana para el Control del Abuso de Drogas, or Inter-American Drug Abuse 
Control Commission), undertook an investigation of the health and environmental effects of 
glyphosate spraying in Colombia. The study concluded that there were no significant risks to 
human health from the aerial spraying and that spraying was much safer than the alternatives of 
burning coca in farm fields or manual deracination of the plants.378 The study was widely 
criticised by civil society groups, which noted that by this time the government of Colombia had 
received thousands of complaints of health problems associated with spraying, which were not 
taken into account by the CICAD researchers.379   
 
Numerous complaints of health problems associated with aerial spraying were made to human 
rights bodies and other authorities over the years.380 In 2008, Ecuador filed a case with the 
International Court of Justice alleging that Ecuadorians living near the border with Colombia 
were suffering ill effects of glyphosate spraying, including “burning, itching eyes, skin sores, 
intestinal bleeding and even death,” with children especially affected.381 Ecuador requested that 
Colombia limit its spraying to at least 10 kilometers away from the border. The case was settled 
in 2013 before the International Court was to hold final hearings on the matter. Colombia 
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reportedly provided compensation for damages to people and livestock and agreed to a buffer 
zone of no spraying near the border.382     
 
In 2015, the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) of WHO undertook a review 
of animal and human studies and classified glyphosate as “probably carcinogenic to humans.”383 
This classification is used by IARC “when there is limited evidence of carcinogenity in humans 
and sufficient evidence of carcinogenity in experimental animals” (emphasis in original).384  
 
Investigators at the Universidad de los Andes undertook research using a large data set capturing 
millions of individual records of medical consultations among people affected by unannounced 
incidents of spraying in the heart of the period of intensive spraying from 2003 to 2007.373 These 
data included multiple observations for given individuals, providing something of a control over 
individual characteristics such as baseline health. The authors also had daily data on the level of 
spraying in all the municipalities in Colombia.  
 
Exposure to aerial spraying was significantly associated in this large sample with increased 
incidence of dermatological and respiratory symptoms in the 15 days following exposure to the 
herbicide.373 It was also highly significantly related to incidence of miscarriage, as shown in 
Table 3 with an estimated one standard deviation increase in aerial spraying associated with a 
10-15% increase in miscarriages amongst women exposed to the herbicide during pregnancy. 
The relationship between spraying and miscarriages was somewhat stronger in low-income 
communities but also highly significant in higher-income municipalities.373 The effects of aerial 
spraying on miscarriages are greater in municipalities with positive levels of spraying between 
2003 and 2007, and for the non-migrant sample of women exposed to aerial spraying.  
   
[Table 3 HERE] 
 
Signaling an end to over 20 years of the practice, in May 2015 the government of Colombia 
decided to stop using aerial fumigation of coca fields.387 The decision came on the heels of the 
IARC report on glyphosate and also followed a recommendation to cease glyphosate spraying by 
the Colombian minister of health.   
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With respect to coca eradication and other forcible crop eradication programmes, the effects of 
exposure to herbicides are far from the only health concern. Farm households in the Andes have 
complained that aerial spraying and some other eradication activities have affected food crops or 
food from animal husbandry on which they are also dependent for income or direct 
consumption.382 Contamination of water sources has also been a complaint.   
 
Crop eradication activities have forced poor rural households to be displaced, often to more 
marginal and hostile environments and at times with deadly consequences. In her extensive 
review of the history of forced eradication programmes, Buxton notes the following:365 
 About 260,000 households or over 1 million people were forcibly displaced and faced 
starvation and lethal epidemics of infectious disease during opium eradication campaigns in 
Myanmar in the mid-2000s. 
 Some 65,000 people were forcibly displaced in Lao PDR as part of “zero opium” campaigns 
in 2003-2004, resulting in mass poverty with men exploited as laborers in neighboring 
Thailand and many young women turning to the sex trade for survival. 
 In Bolivia, crop eradication programmes in the early 2000s threw 50,000 households into 
dire poverty and malnutrition with only about 25% receiving any form of assistance. 
 
Displacement compounds socio-economic and cultural differences in diet, nutrition, health 
habits, and housing, and it can exacerbate or cause psychological problems associated with 
vulnerability and forced re-location such as post-traumatic stress disorder.365  
 
In addition to large-scale displacement and the disruption and poverty it brings, people who grow 
crops linked to drug production often face violence as a fact of life. Drug traffickers purchasing 
coca for the manufacture of cocaine or opium for heroin production for illicit markets may 
enforce the obligations of crop producers through violence. As Mejía notes, since contracts in 
illegal markets are not enforced with the help of the courts or the rule of law, traffickers take it 
upon themselves to use their own violent means.374 While in some cases in the Andes drug 
trafficking organizations provide infrastructure, even schools and health centres, to communities 
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relying on drug crop cultivation for survival, sometimes the interaction with drug traffickers is in 
the form of death threats and lethal gun battles.386  
 
UN Women in its pre-drugs UNGASS reflection concluded that crop eradication in the Andes 
destroys food crops that are the domain of women and enable them to have some economic 
autonomy in the household.387 The German bilateral development organization GIZ 
(Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit) noted that women’s roles in ensuring food 
security in households involved with drug crops is not taken into account either in eradication 
programmes or when alternative livelihoods are offered to households, generally targeting 
men.388   
 
In Africa, rural households depend on cannabis as a cash crop in numerous countries. Cannabis 
is often interplanted with food crops, and cannabis eradication campaigns that burn farm fields 
indiscriminately have threatened food security of farmers in some of the world’s poorest 
nations.390 Klantschnig characterizes cannabis eradication in Nigeria as the most violent and 
repressive part of government drug-control operations, with the violence linked especially to 
invasion of rural communities and destruction of farmland.390  
 
[open box] 
Box 5: Environmental damage and drug prohibition 
The pursuit of eradication of drugs and drug crops causes environmental damage with health 
consequences. Salisbury and Fagan documented displacement of coca farming due to eradication 
activities into areas protected for flora and fauna conservation in Peru near the border with 
Brazil.386 These authors conclude that before intensive eradication activities, coca cultivation in 
Peru was environmentally sound and associated with relatively little deforestation and a 
clustering of coca bushes that in some cases helped anchor the soil. With coca eradication – 
mostly manual eradication in the area they studied – farmers have been displaced to more remote 
areas with devastating consequences for biodiversity in the Peruvian Amazon.386 They also note 
the involvement of drug traffickers in logging and other potentially ecologically damaging 
activities.  
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From 2000 to 2014, Honduras and Guatemala witnessed some of the most rapid and extensive 
deforestation in the world. McSweeney and colleagues attribute this phenomenon in part to the 
clearing of forest land by drug trafficking organizations for roads and landing strips as well as for 
large ranches owned by traffickers.390 In addition, people enjoying the profits of illicit drug 
markets have  invested in forest-clearing activities such as cattle ranching, palm oil production, 
often at the expense of the forest-based activities of indigenous peoples.390 Deforestation in 
Central America since 2000 has closely tracked the movement of cocaine through Honduras, for 
example (Figure 24). 
 
[Figure 24 HERE] 
From McSweeney, 2014.390 
 
[close box] 
 
In the Andes, one of the most important health consequences of crop eradication may in fact be 
the horrific violence being experienced in Mexico and Central America. As Mejía and Restrepo 
note, in the face of intensive coca eradication activities in Colombia, major drug trafficking 
organizations moved their bases of operation from Colombia to Mexico and Central America, 
where they have been part of the deadly violence in that region.50  
 
Some forced eradication programmes are judged by experts to be highly cost-ineffective, even 
without accounting for their impact on health. Mejía estimates that eliminating the marginal cost 
of eliminating the amount of coca needed to produce 1 kg of cocaine is about US $240 000.374 In 
announcing the end to US support to poppy eradication in Afghanistan, then US envoy Richard 
Holbrooke cited an estimate that destroying a hectare of poppies cost US $44 000.391 Holbrooke 
noted: 
 
The United States [and its allies] are not going to go around assisting or participating in 
the destruction of poppy fields anymore. The United States has wasted hundreds of 
millions of dollars doing this…. All we did was alienate poppy farmers who were poor 
farmers, who were growing the best cash crop they could grow in a market where they 
78 
 
couldn’t get other things to market, and we were driving people into the hands of the 
Taliban.391  
 
 
A better way for drug policy? Learning from selected experiences 
 
The public health harms of the pursuit of drug prohibition have led some cities and countries to 
rethink approaches to drug control. Their experiences with respect to many of the health 
problems described in previous sections are largely replicable and show the path to drug policies 
that support health and development and do not undermine human rights. 
 
Rejecting criminalisation of minor offenses and scaling up health services 
Portugal’s transition from decades of isolating authoritarian rule to democratic governance in the 
mid-1970s brought enormous social change. Opening its doors to the world brought Portugal a 
new place in international relations but also a flow of illicit drugs for which it was ill-prepared. 
By the 1980s, the Portuguese people considered drugs to be their most pressing social 
problem.392 HIV linked to injection drug use was exploding, drug dependence was an important 
public health problem, and more aggressive policing did not seem to deter drug use. 
 
In 1998, a multi-sectoral expert committee was convened by the national government to address 
the drug problem. Its proposed solution, eventually written into a 2000 law that came into force 
in 2001, was to remove criminal sanctions from individual-level use and possession of all 
drugs.393 Individual-level use was defined liberally as the quantity needed for 10 days’ use. 
Individual-level drug infractions were still illegal but only under administrative law; they could 
not be punished by a prison sentence and were not attached to a criminal record. Larger-scale 
offenses such as trafficking and sale of large amounts of drugs retained penal sanctions.392 
 
People found to be engaging in minor infractions are invited – not required – to meet with what 
are called ‘dissuasion committees’, groups of health and social sector practitioners who offer 
people the chance to be referred to services voluntarily and try to determine if there is 
problematic drug use to be addressed. HIV prevention services, including OST for people using 
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opioids and NSP, were scaled up dramatically, as were services offering treatment for drug 
dependence other than OST.392 
 
The results of this experience may be judged by numerous outcomes, but for one of the main 
harms being addressed, unsafe injection-linked HIV transmission, the experience can be said to 
have succeeded. As shown in Figure 25, new HIV transmission among people who inject drugs 
declined from almost 800 cases in 2003 to less than 100 in 2012.394 Injection as a mode of drug 
use has also declined since 2001, as has other problem drug use.395 Independent researchers 
studying the Portuguese experience note with respect to the health benefits such as these that it is 
difficult to disentangle the impact of the actual decriminalisation from the impact of the dramatic 
scale-up of health and social services.394 
 
[Figure 25 HERE] 
From J. Goulão, Government of Portugal.394 
 
Critics of the Portuguese policy decision feared that drug use in Portugal would increase overall. 
As of the 2011 compilation of figures by the EU’s monitoring body, this was not the case for 
cannabis use in the last year (Figure 26), where Portugal’s totals are on the low side for the EU, 
and the ranking of Portugal with respect to amphetamine use in the last year is similar.396   
 
[Figure 26 HERE]  
From EMCDDA, Statistical bulletin, 2011.396  
 
Faced with an extensive open scene of heroin injection and a rapidly growing drug-related HIV 
epidemic in the late 1980s, the Swiss public regarded drugs as a major social scourge. In 
Switzerland, the police attempted geographical confinement of people who injected drugs, most 
notably corralling them into a public park in Zurich that became known as the ‘needle park.’397 
Needle exchange was not permitted in Switzerland at the time, and methadone was heavily 
regulated with each case requiring special clearance by the health authorities.397 The benefits of 
lowering the threshold of services for people who injected drugs – especially needle and syringe 
programmes and OST – were soon made clear to policy-makers, and Switzerland accomplished 
one of the most effective scale-ups of HIV prevention services in history.398 The country went on 
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to pioneer supervised injection sites in its largest cities, which were quickly seen to help reduce 
both overdose deaths and public injecting, and medical administration of heroin or heroin-
assisted therapy (HAT) for those relatively few opioid-dependent people for whom other 
treatments did not produce the desired result. Like Portugal, Switzerland witnessed a precipitous 
decline in HIV incidence linked to drug injection and sustained that decline for a long period.399 
The HAT program in Switzerland was established over the objections of the INCB and with 
openness by the Swiss authorities to evaluations by independent researchers.398,400 Evaluations of 
the Swiss HAT experience have consistently shown good results in reduction of illicit drug use, 
crime and mortality linked to the program,401,402 findings later replicated in other settings.403 
 
In referendums the Swiss public endorsed OST, NSP and HAT as part of a major harm reduction 
pillar in national drug policy, all the while rejecting decriminalisation of drugs.398 In 2013, 
Switzerland decriminalised minor cannabis offenses, making them administrative infractions.404 
 
The Czech Republic in the late 1980s emerged from a long period of Soviet occupation at a time 
when HIV and drug injection were on the rise across Europe. The Czech experience is especially 
notable as visionary health professionals helped lead the country to invest in low-threshold HIV 
prevention services before an injection-linked HIV could take hold, thus sustainably averting the 
run-away epidemics seen elsewhere in Europe.405 In the early post-Soviet period, the Czech (then 
Czechoslovak) authorities sought a legal regime that would keep minor drug infractions out of 
the penal code. The drug law of the newly independent country established possession of drugs 
for individual use as and administrative – not criminal – infraction.406  
 
Drug use became a major political issue in the cities in the 1990s. In 1998, the Czech Republic 
changed its approach and criminalized penalties for all drug offenses involving a certain quantity 
of drugs that was not clearly specified. Remarkably, the government commissioned academic 
researchers to study the impact of the new law. Led by Tomáš Zábranský (a JHU-Lancet 
Commissioner), the study team found that the new criminal penalties did not reduce problematic 
drug use or the availability of drugs, as their supporters had claimed they would do, and that the 
policing and incarceration needed to enforce the law was very costly.406 Following long debate, 
the 1998 law was replaced in 2010 by a law that decriminalised use and possession below clearly 
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defined cut-off amounts for all drugs. The Czech experience is also remarkable in that the 
national drug policy coordinators in the post-Soviet period have all been persons with frontline 
health or social service experience with people who use drugs.407 
 
Decriminalisation of or at least removal of custodial penalties for minor drug offenses is more 
the rule than the exception in Western Europe. A 2015 review noted that EU countries have 
instituted a range of practices at the time of arrest or with respect to prosecution and sentencing 
that have effectively reduced criminal sanctions for minor drug offenses.408 Most countries have 
recognized that a large part of non-violent drug-related crime is committed by a very small 
number of persons with problematic use who should be identified and directed to help with the 
health and social problems at the root of their infractions, and most countries have explicit 
procedures to remove these persons from criminal proceedings.408 In addition, EU countries have 
the highest coverage of OST and needle exchange of any region, and most countries have high 
coverage of ART for people who inject drugs. These factors have together led to a situation in 
which HIV transmission by means of injection with contaminated equipment, while not 
eliminated, is no longer a significant contributor to HIV epidemics at a population level (Figure 
27).75 
 
[Figure 27 HERE] 
From EMCDDA, European drug report, 2015.75 
 
The Netherlands’ drug policy experience has unique harm reduction aspects, as described in web 
appendix XVI. 
 
 
Expanding public health action against HIV in North America: Vancouver, Canada 
 
In the mid-1990s, Vancouver, Canada, was home to an epidemic of HIV infection among PWID 
living in the city’s Downtown Eastside (DTES) area. With an annual incidence of 18.6 per 100 
person-years in 1996-97,409 the epidemic was characterised as the most rapid spread of HIV 
infection seen outside of sub-Saharan Africa.410 Drug-use patterns had shifted with the increased 
availability of powder cocaine, which was often injected 10 or more times daily by local 
PWID.411 Although a local NSP was in operation, it was constrained by restrictive rules and 
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limited hours of operation.410 Further, efforts to deinstitutionalise people living with mental 
illness resulted in large numbers of vulnerable individuals arriving in the DTES with little 
support.410 Lastly, the dense network of single-room occupancy hotels fostered the creation of 
risky indoor injecting environments.409  
 
Faced with dual epidemics of HIV infection and overdose, in 1997 the local health board 
declared a public health emergency in the DTES.410 Over the next 15 years, various interventions 
were implemented to address the HIV epidemic. First, responsibility for the delivery of 
methadone shifted from the federal to the provincial government, resulting in a large increase in 
the number of individuals receiving methadone in the DTES.412 Second, given a growing body of 
research revealing the limitations of the local NSP,413 the local health authority revised its 
policies and instituted a decentralised NSP, removed limits on the number of syringes that could 
be obtained, as well as the one-for-one exchange rule, and expanded hours of operation.413 All 
local health clinics soon implemented NSP and, importantly, PWID increasingly became 
involved in the delivery of NSP services. These peer-run NSP, including fixed and outreach 
services, were found to effectively reach those PWID at highest risk of acquiring HIV.414 An 
evaluation of these changes to NSP policies revealed large declines in syringe borrowing and 
lending over time, as well as HIV incidence.413    
An important third development was the widespread delivery of ART and related support for 
local PWID. Although many jurisdictions have excluded PWID from ART programmes or 
limited access to former PWID, all HIV-positive PWID in Vancouver, regardless of whether 
they were actively using drugs or not, were offered ART. Recent analyses have revealed large 
increases in access to ART among PWID over time, as well as large declines in the median HIV 
RNA viral load within this population.415 A landmark study in 2009 revealed that these 
reductions in “community viral load” were strongly associated with declining HIV incidence 
among local PWID.415 
A fourth important development was the implementation of two supervised injection sites in 
Vancouver where PWID can inject pre-obtained illicit drugs under the supervision of nurses. The 
sites include a large stand-alone facility that accommodates an average of 800 injections per day, 
and a smaller program within a large integrated day program and residence for people living with 
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HIV. The larger program, named Insite, has been shown to have reduced syringe sharing among 
PWID,416 and modelling studies suggest that the site is reducing HIV incidence.417 The 
programme has remained controversial, however, in 2011 the Supreme Court justices of Canada 
ruled 9-0 in favour of the continued operation of Insite, noting that the site had been proven to 
save lives without any negative impacts on the government’s public health and safety 
objectives.418   
Although the response to the HIV epidemic among PWID in Vancouver evolved slowly, the 
impact has been impressive. The HIV epidemic was successfully reversed through a 
comprehensive combination prevention approach involving harm reduction and addiction and 
HIV treatment. In addition to dramatic declines in syringe borrowing and lending, the annual 
HIV incidence rate declined from 18.6 per 100 person-years in 1996-97 to below 0.38 per 100 
person-years since 2008.412 The case of the Vancouver epidemic should serve as a reminder that 
HIV epidemics among PWID can be reversed through comprehensive combination prevention 
approaches, provided the necessary political will exists.  
 
Reducing drug-related harm in sub-Saharan Africa 
Even without fundamental change in their drug laws and in the face of political and economic 
constraints, some countries have found ways to strengthen health sector approaches that are a 
departure from policing-centred drug policy.  An estimated 500 000 people use opioids in East 
Africa, and in Tanzania alone an estimated 30 000 people inject opioids.310 HIV prevalence 
among people who inject drugs in Tanzania is estimated to be in the range of 42-50% and is 
plainly an important challenge for the national HIV response.419 In 2011, Tanzania undertook the 
first relatively large-scale OST programme using methadone, beginning with a site at Muhimbili 
National Hospital in Dar es Salaam, now with four sites and an enrollment of about 2500.  
 
The methadone programme has had good success in retaining people in treatment, with lessons 
learned along the way about the importance of keeping methadone doses adequately high.310 The 
programme has also had excellent results in linking methadone patients living with HIV to 
sustained ART.419 Active TB case finding was also conducted among methadone patients with 
links to care.420 As noted by Guise and others, the fact that Tanzania did not require people to be 
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registered as drug users with the police, was a great advantage; police in general have not 
interfered with this program.74 
 
The Tanzania experience bodes well for other experiences in sub-Saharan Africa. In late 2014, 
Senegal announced the first government-support methadone programme in West Africa, a region 
where opioid use is not as well documented as in East Africa but certainly is significant.421 The 
Senegal programme promises an integrated approach to drug-related and HIV treatment, care 
and support. 
 
Reducing harms in prison 
Combined harm reduction and HIV treatment measures in prison have proven very effective in a 
variety of settings. Spain’s experience illustrates the synergistic impact of combined 
interventions. The frank recognition in Spain of extensive drug use within prison walls led to the 
establishment of both OST and needle and syringe programmes in the prison service.422 ART in 
prison was provided. The dramatic decline in HIV incidence in Spanish prisons from about 7 per 
1000 in 2000 to virtually 0 per 1000 in 2012 attests to the effectiveness of this combination of 
interventions.422 
 
Moldova, unusually for its region, began offering sterile injection equipment in prisons in 1999. 
The Moldova prison NSP model relies for distribution of equipment on trained focal points, thus 
enabling their peers to get syringes and other equipment without having to ask prison 
authorities.423 ART is also provided. In 2014, Moldova began providing naloxone in prison.  HIV 
prevalence in Moldovan prisons where these services are available declined from 4.2% in 2007 
to 1.9% in 2012, and HCV prevalence from 21% to 8.6% in the same period.424   
 
Reducing the harm of overdose 
Low- and middle-income countries and countries with harsh drug laws can also make progress 
on eliminating overdose deaths. In the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan, for 
example, hundreds of overdoses were reversed in part by people who use drugs themselves who 
were trained in the use of naloxone.425 Using data from the Russian Federation, one modeling 
exercise found that if even 20% of people who experience overdose could be reached with 
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naloxone, overdose deaths would decline by over 13% in five years at a cost of US $94 per 
quality-adjusted life year (QALY) gained.426  
 
In Western Europe, overdose programmes are beginning to target the high-risk population of 
people leaving prison and entering the community. Scotland is the first country to have a 
nationwide programme that distributes naloxone to people at the end of a prison sentence.427 
Programmes run by people who use drugs themselves had shown the feasibility of this 
intervention for years before the Medicines Act of 2005 opened the doors to removing legal 
penalties against anyone who uses naloxone to save a life.428 The government’s 2014 evaluation 
of the first three years of the program estimated that over 500 overdose deaths had been averted 
and 90% of those who participated, including people who use drugs, said that the program 
helped them better understand the causes of overdose.428 An innovative experience with 
naloxone for recently released prisoners in the politically challenging environment of a US state 
is described in web appendix XVII. 
 
Harm reduction can also take the form of discouraging the most dangerous modes of consuming 
drugs. An innovative programme in Germany aimed to persuade people injecting opioids to 
switch to inhaling them.429  In this case, participants were provided with good-quality foil for 
inhalation; people using some of Germany’s 24 supervised injection sites were the target 
population because drug smoking and inhalation are also allowed in the sites.429 While the 
follow-up was not of very long duration, this pilot effort found that more than half of those 
approached reported having used the foil provided to smoke rather than inject between visits to 
the site, with older people reporting higher inhalation, some noting that they needed to give their 
veins a rest.429 There are 400 000 dispensing points for sterile injecting equipment in Germany. 
The researchers involved with the smoking promotion recommended that smoking equipment be 
made available along with injection equipment.429 
 
Eliminating the harms of compulsory treatment 
Some countries may be moving away from detention of people who use drugs in squalid 
facilities using brutal punishment and forced labour in the name of treatment. Beginning in 2011, 
Malaysia began implementing a plan to convert 18 of its 28 compulsory treatment centres into 
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‘cure and care’ clinics offering voluntary in-patient and out-patient treatment for drug 
dependence, including OST.430 These clinics use existing health infrastructure, and the drug law 
has not changed. As of early 2015, some 36 000 people who use drugs had used these new 
services.430 Early results indicate that among people who used both methamphetamine and 
opioids, use declined after the treatment received in ‘cure and care’ facilities.429 A qualitative 
study indicated that patients appreciated the range of activities offered in the new services, 
including the stabilizing effect of OST, psychosocial support from staff and peers, and links to 
other health services.431  
 
In Vietnam, compulsory rehabilitation centres existed for both people who use drugs and sex 
workers, but in 2012 it was decided to discontinue detention of sex workers in these centres.431 
The centres for drug users still exist, but a law was passed that in theory enables people in these 
centres the right to appeal their situation and bring complaints to court with legal representation; 
it remains to be seen how this provision will be used.432 In late 2012, UNAIDS announced that 
pledges had been secured from nine countries in East and Southeast Asia to reduce populations 
in compulsory treatment centres and decrease the number of centres.433 
      
Reducing harms in drug crop production 
 
In 2006, Bolivia elected Evo Morales, a former coca farmer, as president of the country. The 
Morales government led Bolivia to reclaim its commitment to protecting traditional uses of coca 
leaf. Coca leaf has a long history of traditional and cultural use in the Andes as a mild stimulant, 
chewed and also used in tea. It is said by rural households to relieve hunger, as well as some 
stomach ailments and dizziness.434 The 1961 Single Convention (art. 49) explicitly states that 
governments that are ratifying parties to the convention “may at the time of signature, ratification 
or accession reserve the right to permit temporarily in …its territories…coca leaf chewing” 
subject to a number of restrictions that are specified in the article, but otherwise coca leaf is 
scheduled as a dangerous narcotic.6 
 
Under Morales, Bolivia, which ratified in the 1961 Convention under a previous military 
government, did not want temporary leave to allow coca chewing but rather sought to make a 
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permanent reservation to the Single Convention for traditional uses of coca leaf as a mild 
stimulant. In a nearly unprecedented move, Bolivia withdrew its ratification of the convention 
and sought permission to re-accede with a formal reservation for traditional uses of coca leaf.435 
Under the terms of the Single Convention, Bolivia’s re-accession would have been blocked if 61 
ratifying parties to the Convention objected. In the event, only 15 countries objected,435 and 
Bolivia made its point – coca and cocaine are not the same. 
 
Licit uses of coca leaf also led Bolivia to establish an innovative kind of alternative livelihood 
for coca growers. With firm recognition of the need for a legal market for coca leaf, the 
government established a scheme by which some coca farmers are permitted to grow coca for 
licit use over a fixed area of land – one cato or 1600 m2.436 Coca grown above that limit could be 
subject to eradication. As noted by Ledebur and Youngers, the program has been a success partly 
because strong growers’ unions or federations are on the scene helping to oversee the 
programme, which they have found to be in their interest.436 The cato zones have seen significant 
reductions in the growing of coca for illicit markets, much more than the reductions that resulted 
from forced eradication efforts.436 There has been a concomitant reduction in reported violence 
in the cato communities as well. The Bolivia example is a rare case of meaningful participation 
of drug crop farmers in planning and implementing programmes meant to benefit them.  
 
 
Conclusions and recommendations 
Policies meant to prohibit or greatly suppress drugs present an apparent paradox. They are 
portrayed by policy-makers as necessary to preserve public health and safety, and yet they 
directly and indirectly contribute to lethal violence, disease, discrimination, forced displacement, 
injustice, and the undermining of people’s right to health.  
 
The framers of international human rights law foresaw that there would be times, especially in 
the face of security threats, when some individual rights would have to be abrogated in favor of 
preserving collective safety and well-being.437 There is international consensus that if policies 
that abrogate rights are necessary for the greater good, those policies (1) should pursue a 
legitimate and transparently defined goal and be proportionate to that goal; (2) must be the least 
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rights-restrictive and the least harmful possible to achieve the stated goal; (3) should include 
adequate remedies for those whose rights are violated; and (4) should not interfere with the 
democratic functioning of society.438 
 
In our view, policies pursuing drug prohibition or severe suppression do not meet these criteria, 
even if one accepts that drugs in and of themselves somehow present a serious security threat. 
Policies that pursue drug prohibition or heavy suppression do not represent the least harmful way 
to address drugs; the aim they pursue is not well-defined or realistic; their interventions are not 
proportionate to the problem; they destabilize democratic societies; and those harmed by them 
often have no recourse to remedies to mitigate those harms. The ‘scourge’ of drugs and the 
harms of drug use are exaggerated to justify these measures. These policies also contradict the 
spirit of the 2030 SDGs and the bedrock human rights norms of the community of nations.   
 
Some experts have argued that the benefits of prohibition are underappreciated. Proponents of 
prohibition have noted that while the results in drug supply and demand reduction have left 
something to be desired, consumption, supply and related harms would be even more plentiful 
without the interdiction and criminalization of use associated with prohibition – a difficult 
argument to refute (or confirm).  UNODC has asserted that without elements of prohibition, drug 
use could be as widespread as alcohol use, with disastrous consequences.439 Caulkins’ thoughtful 
analysis suggests that no proponent of prohibition should ever have expected complete 
eradication of drug markets, but that driving drug activity underground has benefits for some 
individuals and society, especially reductions in drug dependence that are the result of very high 
drug prices in illicit markets and other barriers to obtaining drugs.440 We appreciate efforts such 
as his to bring empirical rigour to this question, but based on the evidence identified and 
analysed by the Commission, we conclude that the harms of prohibition far outweigh the 
benefits.    
 
The violence associated both with illicit drug markets and with policing, including policing by 
military and paramilitary forces, is a deeply traumatic violation of the right to health. The cost of 
incarceration of enormous numbers of people – men, women and children -- for minor, non-
violent offenses weighs heavily on societies. The misuse of the important social tool of the 
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criminal justice system to discriminate against racial and ethnic minorities is unacceptable. The 
cost of infectious disease made more likely, more severe, and more difficult to address by law 
enforcement practices and incarceration is completely preventable illness and death. Overdose 
death is also preventable and affects some of society’s most marginalised persons. The 
eradication of crops used in the manufacture of drugs is harmful to whole communities and 
families as well as to the environment. And there is untold suffering of millions whose pain 
cannot be relieved by effective analgesics because of fears of diversion of medicines to illicit 
use.  
 
Standard public health and scientific approaches that should be part of policy-making on drugs 
are dismissed in the pursuit of drug prohibition and suppression. The idea of reducing the harm 
of many kinds of human behavior is central to public policy in the areas of traffic safety, tobacco 
and alcohol regulation, food safety, safety in sports and recreation, and many other areas of 
human life where the behavior in question is not prohibited. But explicitly seeking to reduce 
drug-related harms through policy and programmes is regularly resisted in drug control. The idea 
that all drug use is ‘abuse’ and that therefore only immediate abstinence is acceptable seems to 
impede making harm reduction a drug policy priority.  
 
The persistence of unsafe injection-linked HIV transmission that could be stopped with proven, 
cost-effective measures is one of the great failures of the global HIV response. People who use 
drugs, even if they do not immediately stop using drugs, can make good decisions to protect 
themselves and those around them. Denying them the chance to do so by failing to offer harm 
reduction services dehumanises them, violates their rights, undermines the public’s health, 
causes needless death and disease, and costs society money and needless suffering.  We agree 
with the conclusion of the UNAIDS-Lancet Commission that too many countries are letting 
people who inject drugs die rather than remove the barriers, including drug law and policy, that 
stand in the way of life-saving services.441  
 
 
Countries have failed to recognise and correct the health and human rights harms that pursuit of 
prohibition and drug suppression have caused and in so doing neglect their legal responsibilities. 
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They readily incarcerate people for minor offenses but then neglect their responsibility to 
provide health services in custodial settings that are the equivalent of those in the community. 
They recognise uncontrolled illegal markets as the consequence of their policies, but they do 
little to protect people from toxic, adulterated drugs that are inevitable in illegal markets or the 
trauma and violence of organised criminals, often made worse by repressive policing. They 
waste public resources on policies that do not demonstrably eliminate drugs or impede the 
functioning of drug markets, and they miss opportunities to invest public resources wisely in 
proven cost-effective health services for people often too frightened to seek services. 
 
Calls for ‘balanced’ drug policy as in the 2009 UN political declaration on drugs have not been 
heeded. It may be said that the Western European countries that have decriminalised (formally or 
less formally) drug use and minor possession and sale and have scaled up comprehensive harm 
reduction services and ensured access to ART for PWUD have not completely rejected 
prohibition. Drugs are still illegal in these countries. But in our view, these experiences do 
represent a significant rejection of traditional prohibition, not least because they bring public 
health goals and policies to the centre of drug control. They are not the end of the reform story, 
but they give the world an alternative that should continue to be rigourously evaluated as to 
public health and human rights impact. 
 
We urge the member states participating in the April 2016 UNGASS to bring public health 
evidence into the debates as they strive to formulate policy directions that are consistent with the 
principles of the UN Charter, the spirit of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals, and the 
human rights norms to which virtually all UN member states are committed, including the right 
to health.  The UNGASS will do itself credit by helping the world move away from a war on 
drugs that is inevitably a war on people who use drugs. Toward this end, we offer the following 
recommendations: 
 
Decriminalise minor drug offenses – use, possession, and petty sale:  The long experiences in 
Portugal, the Czech Republic and a number of other countries with decriminalisation of minor 
drug offenses demonstrate the benefits of treating minor infractions without recourse to criminal 
sanctions. Those benefits include facilitating the offer of health and social support to people who 
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may need it; reduction of incarceration of men, women, and young people with all its harms; and 
eliminating the wastefulness of the police’s pursuit of minor offenders. Decriminalisation of 
minor offenses also makes it harder to use drug laws as a weapon against racial or ethnic 
minorities or politically unfavoured groups. Decriminalisation should always be accompanied by 
measures to ensure the capacity of health and social services to address drug-related harms or 
problem drug use as needed. 
 
Reduce the violence and other harms of drug policing:  Military and paramilitary forces are 
likely to exacerbate violence in pursuing drug traffickers; their participation should be phased 
out as much as possible.  Police should also desist from practises that directly cause health 
harms, including all practises that disrupt access to essential services and practises such as 
seizure of injection equipment. There should be measures to monitor and prevent sexual violence 
linked to drug markets and to ensure care and support for survivors.  Paraphernalia laws should 
be modified so that possession of sterile injection equipment is not a crime, and possession of 
syringes with trace amount of drugs is not considered drug possession.  
 
Make harm reduction measures a central pillar of health systems and drug policy: Consistent 
with the fundamental principles of public health, reducing health harms of drugs and drug 
control measures should be a high priority for policy-makers. As for tobacco, alcohol, and many 
other behavior-related policies in most countries, drug policy should include measures to reduce 
drug-related harm that are not linked to a goal of abstinence that is unrealistic for some people. 
The deadly harms of HCV are preventable, but not without scale-up of a full range of services 
for PWID. Fiscal sense, good public health practice, and meeting human rights obligations all 
come together in a strong harm reduction pillar of drug policy. The 2016 UNGASS should do 
better than previous UN gatherings and call harm reduction by its name with a strong 
endorsement for its centrality in drug policy. 
 
Invest in HIV, HCV, TB, and drug dependence treatment:  The use of involuntary detention, 
beating, other physical abuse, and forced labour in the name of treatment of drug dependence 
must stop. Underinvestment in proven treatment for opioid addiction must be rectified. 
Unscientific ideas about OST as “another form of addiction” should be countered in medical 
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training, by health professionals and their associations, and by policy-makers interested in cost-
effective and efficacious policy. Research on humane forms of other drug dependence treatment 
is urgently needed and should not be stopped by over-cautious anti-diversion measures. WHO in 
collaboration with UNODC should be given the resources to monitor the quality of drug 
dependence treatment programmes on a regular basis and to signal to governments programmes 
that are not scientifically sound and may cause harm. Treatment of HIV, HCV, and TB must 
prioritise people who use drugs. People in prison and pretrial detention should be included in 
treatment programmes.  Health professionals should counter myths about the lack of capacity of 
people who use drugs to adhere to treatment. The advocacy and resulting measures that helped to 
bring down the prices of early generations of HIV medicines are urgently needed to enable 
PWUD to benefit from the new class of HCV medicines. 
 
Ensure access to controlled medicines: Action is urgently needed to ensure that decisions on 
procurement and use of controlled medicines are made by health professionals without 
inappropriate constraints linked to over-cautious drug control measures. Countries in which the 
vast majority of patients needing pain medications and other controlled medicines are not getting 
them should urgently review their drug control laws and policies against WHO guidelines and 
INCB recommendations and weigh the costs of drug control against the rights and needs of 
patients. At the international level, WHO’s role in determining the health dangers of drugs, 
specified in the drug conventions, needs to be reinforced. Overriding WHO’s expertise in this 
area should not be undertaken lightly or on the basis of the inertia of adherence to strict drug 
control.  
 
Formulate policies that do not harm women: Alternatives to incarceration for women who have 
committed minor drug infractions benefit families and communities and should be a high 
priority. For the minority of drug-using women who are drug-dependent, there should be 
appropriate health and social support, including treatment programmes that take account of 
gender-based differences in initiation of and motivation for drug use. Protection of women and 
children from violence in law enforcement and supply reduction efforts must be a policy priority 
and should be an indicator of the success of drug policy.  
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Integrate health concerns in supply-side efforts: Providing alternatives to people who produce 
coca, opium poppies or cannabis or to people who produce methamphetamine or other synthetic 
drugs should be part of integrated development or anti-poverty measures in which the people 
affected play a meaningful role in deciding what constitutes an alternative livelihood and not 
separate areas of development that have drug control goals more than development or welfare 
goals. Cultivators must be meaningfully engaged as stakeholders in supply policies.   
 
Improve UN governance of drug policy: WHO must be allowed to do the job established for it in 
international law with regard to assessing the science of potential harms of drugs. The INCB 
should not oppose WHO expert views on the dangerousness of drugs, and the CND should not 
overrule public health expertise without compelling evidence of the benefit of doing so. It is high 
time for health and social sector authorities to be equal partners in national drug policy-making 
bodies in all countries, as well as in CND delegations. Global and regional multilateral drug 
policy-making bodies and supporting technical agencies should include public health expert 
bodies in all aspects of their work.  
 
Include health, human rights, and development in metrics to judge success of drug policy: If drug 
policy is meant to protect the health and well-being of populations, then health outcomes should 
be part of the measurement of drug policy’s success or lack thereof. WHO and UNDP should 
help formulate health and human development metrics of drug policy. As UNDP suggested in its 
paper in the lead-up to the 2016 drugs UNGASS, indicators such as access to treatment, rate of 
overdose deaths, and access to social welfare programmes for people who use drugs are feasible 
to measure and would say more about policies than the number of arrests.13 All drug policies 
should also be studied as to their impact on racial and ethnic minorities, women, children and 
young people, and people living in poverty.  
 
Better and broader research on drugs and drug policy: Bilateral development assistance agencies, 
private foundations concerned about health, and other donors should broaden their support for 
rigorous evaluation of drug policy experiences and experiments. The best social science and 
policy analysis methods should be brought to bear in an objective and non-ideological way to 
understand the impact of drug policy change on the public’s health and well-being. Research on 
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drug dependence should be guided by the best science, should allow people who use drugs 
themselves to have a meaningful voice, and should interrogate the excessive pathologising of 
drug use. We also urge the United Nations, UNODC in particular, to reconstitute the independent 
Reference Group to the UN on HIV and Drug Use or a similar group on health and drug use to 
contribute to high-quality, policy-relevant research on drug use and health. 
 
Scientific approach to regulatory experiments: A regulated legal market for any previously illicit 
drug in the US and Uruguay seemed very unlikely before 2008. It is clear that regulated legal 
markets for substances that have long been harshly criminalised are not politically possible in the 
short term in many countries. But we believe that the weight of evidence of the health and other 
harms of criminal markets and other consequences of prohibition catalogued in this report is 
likely to lead more countries (and more US states) to move gradually toward regulated drug 
markets, a direction we endorse. Regulation of the harms of human activity is the essence of 
public health, as with tobacco and alcohol. As those decisions are taken, we urge governments 
and researchers to apply the scientific method and ensure independent and rigorous evaluation of 
regulated markets to draw lessons and inform improvements in regulatory practices, and then to 
evaluate and improve again.  
 
We urge health professionals in all countries to inform themselves and join debates on drug 
policy at all levels. True to the goals of the international drug control regime, it is possible to 
have drug policy that contributes to the health and well-being of humankind, but not without 
bringing to bear the evidence of the health sciences and the voices of health professionals.  
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FIGURES AND TABLES (separate file) 
 
Appendix 1:  Glossary 
 
This glossary is an excerpt from definitions agreed upon by the Board of Science of the British 
Medical Association and published in BMA Board of Science, Drugs of dependence: the role of 
medical professionals, London, 2013. 
 
Addiction 
Repeated use of a psychoactive substance or substances, to the extent that the user (referred to as 
an addict) is periodically or chronically intoxicated, shows a compulsion to take the preferred 
substance (or substances), has great difficulty in voluntarily ceasing or modifying substance use, 
and exhibits determination to obtain psychoactive substances by almost any means. Typically, 
tolerance is prominent and a withdrawal syndrome frequently occurs when substance use is 
interrupted. The life of the addict may be dominated by substance use to the virtual exclusion of 
all other activities and responsibilities….Addiction is a term of long-standing and variable usage. 
It is regarded by many as a discrete disease entity, a debilitating disorder rooted in the 
pharmacological effects of the Drug, which is often progressive. Addiction is not a diagnostic 
term in the International Classification of Diseases 10th revision (ICD-10), but continues to be 
very widely employed by professionals and the general public. 
 
Decriminalisation 
A process in which the seriousness of a crime or of the penalties the crime attracts is reduced. 
More specifically, it refers to the move from a criminal sanction to the use of civil or 
administrative sanctions. An example in relation to illicit drugs would be where possession of 
cannabis is downgraded from a crime that warrants arrest, prosecution and a criminal record to 
an infraction to be punished with a warning or fine. Decriminalisation is often distinguished from 
Legalisation, which involves the complete repeal of any legal definition as a crime, often 
coupled with a governmental effort to control or influence the market for the affected behaviour 
or product. A distinction is also made between de jure decriminalisation, which involves specific 
reforms to the legal framework, and de facto decriminalisation, which involves a similar 
outcome, but is achieved through ‘turning a blind eye’ to tolerant policing – effectively non-
enforcement of criminal laws that technically remain in force. 
 
Dependence 
As a general term, dependence is the state of needing or depending on something or someone for 
support or to function or survive. As applied to alcohol and other drugs, the term includes 
psychological and physiological aspects. Psychological dependence involves impaired control 
over drug use and a need (craving) for repeated doses of the drug, to feel good or avoid feeling 
bad. Physiological, or physical, dependence is associated with tolerance, where increased doses 
of the drug are required to produce the effects originally produced by lower doses, and 
development of withdrawal syndrome when the drug is withdrawn. The Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th edition revised (DSM-IV) defines it as: 
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‘When an individual persists in use of alcohol or other drugs despite problems related to 
use of the substance, substance dependence may be diagnosed. Compulsive and repetitive 
use may result in tolerance to the effect of the drug and withdrawal symptoms when use is 
reduced or stopped.’ 
 
The DSM-IV definition is roughly equivalent to the dependence syndrome of the ICD-10. In 
the ICD-10 context, the term dependence could refer generally to any of the elements in the 
syndrome. The term can be used generally with reference to the whole range of psychoactive 
drugs (drug dependence, chemical dependence, substance use dependence), or with specific 
reference to a particular drug or class of drugs (eg opioid dependence). While the ICD-10 
describes dependence in terms that are applicable across drug classes, there are differences in the 
characteristic dependence symptoms for different drugs. In biologically oriented discussion, 
dependence is often used to refer only to physical dependence. Dependence or physical 
dependence is also used in the psychopharmacological context in a still narrower sense, 
referring solely to the development of withdrawal symptoms on cessation of drug use. 
 
Dependence potential 
The propensity of a substance, as a consequence of its pharmacological effects on physiological 
or psychological functions, to give rise to dependence on that substance. Dependence potential 
is determined by those intrinsic pharmacological properties that can be measured in animal and 
human drug-testing procedures. It is a term used in applying international drug treaties. 
 
Diversion 
From a medical perspective, diversion is the inappropriate use of a drug by those for whom it 
has been prescribed, or use by a person for whom the medication was not prescribed. The term 
may be used to describe diversion of a shipment of drugs out of legal channels at wholesale level 
or, for example, to describe the sale of prescription methadone to, and use by, an individual for 
whom it was not prescribed. The term diversion is also used in a criminal justice context to refer 
to measures that take an arrestee out of the criminal justice system and into education, medical 
management or another type of intervention.  
 
Drug 
A term of varied usage. In medicine, it refers to any substance with the potential to prevent or 
cure disease or enhance physical or mental welfare, and in pharmacology it refers to any 
chemical agent that alters the biochemical or physiological processes of tissues or organisms. 
Hence, a drug is a substance that is, or could be, listed in a pharmacopoeia. In common usage, 
the term often refers specifically to psychoactive drugs, and often, even more specifically, to 
illicit drugs, of which there is non-medical use in addition to any medical use. Professional 
formulations (e.g. ‘alcohol and other drugs’) often seek to make the point that caffeine, tobacco, 
alcohol and other substances in common non-medical use are also drugs in the sense of being 
taken, at least in part, for their psychoactive effects. 
 
Drug abuse 
A term in wide use but of varying meaning. The DSM-IV defines ‘psychoactive substance 
abuse’ as: 
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‘A maladaptive pattern of substance use leading to clinically significant impairment or 
distress, as manifested by one (or more) of the following, occurring within a 12-month 
period: (1) Recurrent substance use resulting in a failure to fulfil major role obligations 
at work, school, or home (e.g. repeated absences or poor work performance related to 
substance use; substance-related absences, suspensions or expulsions from school; 
neglect of children or household); (2) Recurrent substance use in situations in which it is 
physically hazardous (e.g. driving an automobile or operating a machine when impaired 
by substance use); (3) Recurrent substance-related legal problems (e.g. arrests for 
substance-related disorderly conduct); (4) Continued substance use despite having 
persistent or recurrent social or interpersonal problems caused or exacerbated by the 
effects of the substance (e.g. arguments with spouse about consequences of intoxication, 
physical fights).’ 
 
The term ‘abuse’ is sometimes used disapprovingly to refer to any use at all, particularly of illicit 
drugs. The term is not used in ICD-10 because of its ambiguity and to avoid including social 
consequences in the definition of a diagnosis. Harmful use is the closest equivalent in ICD-10. 
In other contexts, abuse has referred to non-medical or unsanctioned patterns of use, irrespective 
of consequences. Thus the definition published in 1969 by the WHO Expert Committee on Drug 
Dependence was ‘persistent or sporadic excessive drug use inconsistent with or unrelated to 
acceptable medical practice’. The term drug use is often preferred as it is non-judgemental. 
 
Drug control 
The regulation, by a system of laws and agencies, of the production, distribution, sale and use of 
specific psychoactive drugs (controlled substances) locally, nationally or internationally. This 
is the legal aspect of drug policy. 
 
Drug policy 
In the context of psychoactive drugs, the aggregate of policies designed to affect the supply 
and/or demand for Illicit drugs, locally or nationally, including education, treatment, control and 
other programmes and polices to reduce the harms related to illicit drug use. In this context, 
‘drug policy’ often does not include pharmaceutical policy (except with regard to diversion to 
non-medical use), or tobacco or alcohol policy. In the context of the WHO’s Action Programme 
on Essential Drugs, ‘national drug policy’ refers to a national pharmaceutical policy concerning 
the marketing, availability and therapeutic use of medicines. 
 
Harm reduction 
In the context of alcohol or other drugs, harm reduction describes policies or programmes that 
focus directly on reducing the harm resulting from the use of alcohol or other drugs. The term is 
used particularly of policies or programmes that aim to reduce the harm without necessarily 
affecting the underlying drug use; examples include maintenance treatment in opioid 
dependence and needle/syringe exchanges to counteract needle sharing among heroin users. 
Harm reduction can be used either to refer to goals (focusing on the harm rather than on use per 
se) or to means (e.g. needle exchanges, opioid substitution therapy, etc); in the latter sense, it is 
often contrasted to the dichotomy of supply reduction and demand reduction. 
 
Illicit drug 
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A psychoactive substance, the possession, production, sale or use of which is prohibited. 
Strictly speaking, it is not the Drug that is illicit, but its possession, production, sale or use in 
particular circumstances in a given jurisdiction. Illicit drug market, a more exact term, refers to 
the production, distribution, and sale of any drug outside legally sanctioned channels. 
 
Legalisation 
Legalisation is a process of repealing a prohibition (in criminal law) on a given behaviour or 
product – in this context, supply, possession or use of an illicit drug. The process is often 
coupled with a governmental effort to control or influence the market for the affected behaviour 
or product. The term should be distinguished from decriminalisation, which refers to a 
reduction in the seriousness of an offence or of the penalties it attracts, and specifically the move 
from a criminal sanction to a civil or administrative one. 
 
Maintenance treatment 
A method of medical management that involves prescribing and administration of a 
pharmaceutical drug as a ‘substitute’ for an illicit drug, to patients who have become dependent. 
It is most commonly used for opioid dependence (e.g. treatment with methadone or 
buprenorphine – commonly called opioid substitution treatment). The aim is to attenuate 
withdrawal symptoms, diminish opioid craving and arrive at a tolerance threshold, while 
preventing euphoria and sedation from overmedication. 
 
Opiate 
An opiate is an addictive drug, derived from the opium poppy, which reduces pain, induces 
sleep and may alter mood or behaviour (see opioids). This term excludes synthetic opioids. 
 
Opioid 
A generic term applied to alkaloids from the opium poppy (opiates), their synthetic analogues 
and compounds synthesised in the body that interact with specific receptors in the brain and 
reduce pain, induce sleep and may alter mood or behaviour. In high doses they can cause stupor, 
coma and respiratory depression. Opium alkaloids and their semi-synthetic analogues include 
morphine, diacetylmorphine (diamorphine, heroin), hydromorphine, codeine and oxycodone. 
Synthetic opioids include buprenoprhine, methadone, pethidine, pentazocine and tramadol. 
 
Overdose 
The use of any drug in such an amount that acute adverse physical or mental effects are 
produced. It usually implies an amount that constitutes a mortal risk. Deliberate overdose is a 
common means of suicide and attempted suicide. In absolute numbers, overdoses of licit drugs 
are usually more common than those of illicit drugs. Overdose may produce transient or lasting 
effects, or death; the lethal dose of a particular drug varies with the individual and with 
circumstances. Poisoning is a near-synonym in external-cause diagnostic codes. 
 
Problem drug use 
There are varying definitions for problem drug use. In its broadest sense, according to the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), problem drug use is used to describe individuals 
who inject Drugs and/or are considered dependent, facing serious social and health 
consequences as a result. For statistical purposes, the definitions and methods of calculation 
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differ from country to country. The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction 
(EMCDDA) defines problem drug use as ‘injecting drug use or long duration/regular use of 
opioids, cocaine and/or amphetamines’. 
 
Prohibition 
Policy under which the cultivation, manufacture, and/or sale (and sometimes the use) of a 
psychoactive drug are prohibited under criminal law (although pharmaceutical sales are usually 
permitted). 
 
Psychoactive drug or substance 
A substance that, when ingested, affects mental processes (e.g. cognition, mood, sensation and 
behaviour). This term and its equivalent, Psychotropic drug, are the most neutral and 
descriptive terms for the whole class of substances, licit and illicit, of interest to drug policy. 
‘Psychoactive’ does not necessarily imply dependence producing, and in common parlance the 
term is often left unstated, as in drug use/drug abuse or substance abuse/substance use. 
 
 
Recreational use 
Use of a drug, usually an illicit drug, in sociable or relaxing circumstances, by implication 
without dependence or other problems. The term is not favoured by those seeking to define all 
illicit drug use as a problem. 
 
Relapse 
A return to drug use after a period, of abstinence or controlled use, often accompanied by 
reinstatement of dependence symptoms. Some distinguish between relapse and lapse (‘slip’), 
with the latter denoting an isolated occasion of alcohol or drug use. 
 
Substitution treatment 
Treatment of dependence on a psychoactive drug with a substitute drug with cross-dependence 
and cross-tolerance. The goal is to reduce or eliminate use of the original drug and/or to reduce 
harm from a particular method of administration.  
 
Tolerance 
A decrease in response to a drug dose that occurs with continued use. Increased doses of alcohol 
or other drugs are required to achieve the effects originally produced by lower doses.  
Physiological and psychosocial factors may contribute to the development of tolerance, which 
may be physical, behavioural or psychological. With respect to physiological factors, both 
metabolic and/or functional tolerance may develop. By increasing the rate of metabolism of the 
substance, the body may be able to eliminate the substance more readily. Functional tolerance is 
defined as a decrease in sensitivity of the central nervous system to the substance. Behavioural 
tolerance is a change in the effect of a drug as a result of learning or alteration of environmental 
constraints. Acute tolerance is rapid, temporary accommodation to the effect of a substance 
following a single dose. Reverse tolerance, also known as sensitisation, refers to a condition in 
which the response to a substance increases with repeated use. Tolerance is one of the criteria for 
the dependence syndrome. 
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Withdrawal syndrome 
A group of symptoms of variable clustering and degree of severity that occur on cessation or 
reduction of use of a Psychoactive substance that has been taken repeatedly, usually for a 
prolonged period and/or in high doses. The syndrome may be accompanied by signs of 
physiological disturbance. A withdrawal syndrome is one of the indicators of a dependence 
syndrome. It is also the defining characteristic of the narrower psychopharmacological 
meaning of dependence. The onset and course of the withdrawal syndrome are time limited and 
are related to the type of substance and dose being taken immediately before cessation or 
reduction of use. Typically, the features of a withdrawal syndrome are the opposite of those of 
acute intoxication. 
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